Part 3: Second-Century Apologists
Origen was an influential Christian theologian at Alexandria in the third century. Origen was the first systematic theologian, and had a great influence on the later church. Whereas universalism (as we’ve seen) existed in many earlier Christian authors, he provided a clear systematization of it as a doctrine. He did the same for other Christian views, such as trinitarian theology (he was the first to apply the language of one ousia and three hypostaseis to God, which became prominent in the fourth-century theological conflicts). [1] Unfortunately, some of the doctrines that he held were considered orthodox in his day, but were distorted by his later followers and then condemned as heresy, resulting in the condemnation of Origen himself. [2] However, this doesn’t diminish his influence on the third- and fourth-century church. Here we’ll examine his idea of universal apokatastasis in detail.The “Man of Steel”: Origen of Alexandria
Evil as Non-Being
Origen developed his uniquely Christian philosophy in opposition to the ‘gnostic’ Christian groups that existed at that time. These ‘gnostics’ typically held to a stark division between the spiritual and material worlds, the inherent goodness of the former and inherent evilness of the latter, and that humans must embrace the spiritual and escape the material. Valentinian ‘gnostics’ in particular believed that humanity was divided into three classes – material, soulish, and spiritual – that the spiritual would be saved (but not their bodies), the material would perish, and the soulish would have an uncertain salvation (Tripartite Tractate; Irenaeus, AH I.6.1–2). This was effectively an extreme form of predestination, which Origen referred to as the “doctrine of natures” and strongly opposed.
Origen frequently engages the “doctrine of natures,” which he attributes to the ‘gnostics’ Valentinus and Marcion, in his commentary on Romans. He begins by proving that Paul was “set apart for God’s gospel” (Rom 1:1) not because he had a special nature, but because he chose goodness (Comm in Rom I.3). God judges people according to their heart, works, and thoughts (Rom 2:10, 16), not because of their nature (II.4.7; 10.2). God reconciled himself to us “while we were enemies” (Rom 5:10), showing that enemies are not so by nature (IV.12.1–2). A person can present themself as slave to either sin or righteousness, and broken off or grafted into the olive tree (Rom 6:16–18; 11:16–24), they are not determined to one or the other (VI.3.3–5; VIII.11). In fact, based on Rom 14:14ff, the fact is that “none of the things God has created is unclean of its own nature” – it is only “because of the offence” that “what is good of its own nature becomes evil” (XI.42; X.3).
His philosophical basis for this draws upon the idea, common in classical philosophy, that evil is simply a privation (lack) of goodness and not something that subsists in itself. This view was first proposed by Plato and Aristotle, and further developed by Plotinus (a later contemporary of Origen). Origen sets forth a Christian argument for this in his commentary on John 1:3:
“For the Lord said to Moses, ‘He who is, this is my name.’” [Exod 3:14] Now according to us who boast that we belong to the Church, it is the good God who speaks these words. This is the same God the Savior honors when he says, “No one is good except the one God, the Father.” [Mk 10:18] “The one who is good,” therefore, is the same as “the one who is.’’ But evil or wickedness is opposite to the good, and “not being” is opposite to “being.” It follows that wickedness and evil are “not being.” (Comm in John II.95–96)
This argument is Scripturally based: since God is the One who Is and Good, it follows that being and being good are fundamentally the same; therefore, evil is not-being. Origen also adduces a couple of passages that refer to evil or evildoers as “those which are not” (II.94–95; cf. Rom 4:17; Esth 4:22 LXX). He offers yet another argument in his commentary on Romans 14:14–20: “none of the things God has created is unclean of its own nature—for it is an established fact that everything created by the good God is good and clean” (Comm in Rom XI.42.4). In other words, God is Good, and therefore whatever he creates is good, which means that evil is a non-creature.
This is crucial to Origen’s understanding of rational creatures and his refutation of ‘gnosticism’. He sees all rational creatures as having fundamentally the same nature, so that none of them is inherently morally good or evil, but rather every being – with the exception of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit – has the ability to choose good and evil (De Princ I.8.2–3; Comm in John XX.198ff). Even the devil, qua rational being, is not evil in his substance, for that would mean that (as the “deceived” claim) he was made by a different creator.
For insofar as he is the devil, he is not a creation of God, but to the extent that it falls to the devil ‘to be,’ being made, since there is no creator except our God, he is a creation of God. It is as if we should say that a murderer is not a creation of God, while we do not annul the fact that qua man, he has been made by God. (Comm in John II.97)
This concept of evil as not-being, and created substances (qua created by God) as good, is very important for Origen’s eschatology as we will see. It also clears up the controversy of whether or not he believed in the ultimate salvation of the devil.
Punishment as Purification
Another crucial idea developed by Origen, which (like his concept of evil as not-being) has Scriptural and earlier patristic roots, is that God punishes in order to correct. This teaching is found explicitly in some biblical authors (Lam 3:31-33; Heb 12:5-11), along with the theme of punishment and restoration throughout the prophets, and it recurs frequently in the writings of Origen’s predecessor Clement of Alexandria (see my previous post). Origen himself developed this view in opposition to the Marcionite ‘gnostics,’ who distinguished the ‘just’ god YHWH of the Hebrew Bible from the ‘good’ Father of Jesus. Contrary to Marcion, he insists on the identity of YHWH and the Father, drawing heavily on the New Testament to support this view (De Princ II.4).
According to the “heretics,” since YHWH is ‘just’ while the Father is ‘good,’ they can’t be the same; for them, ‘justice’ is retribution, while ‘goodness’ is (equally) doing good to all people indiscriminately (De Princ II.5.1). Origen shows that, according to Scripture, it is also true that YHWH is good and the Father is just, so their view is wrong (II.5.2). Moreover, he draws upon the theme of punishment and restoration in the prophets to show that God’s justice is restorative and not retributive (II.5.3). According to Ezekiel, Sodom who was punished shall be restored (Ezek 16:55); according to Isaiah, Babylon’s punishment is a “help” to her (Isa 47:14–15 LXX); according to Asaph, those whom God punished afterward “sought” him (Ps 78:34).
From all these illustrations it is plain that the just and good God of the law and the gospels is one and the same, and that he does good with justice and punishes in kindness, since neither goodness without justice nor justice without goodness can describe the dignity of the divine nature. (De Princ II.5.3; cf. II.10.6–7; Comm in Rom VI.5.5)
Origen then returns to direct Scriptural affirmations that the God of the law is “good” and the God of the gospels is “just,” so the Marcionites are wrong (II.5.4). His view of punishment as restorative is crucial to his defense against the ‘gnostics’: if God punished someone without a view to their ultimate good, then his justice and goodness would be incompatible. For Origen, God is simple (without parts), so his attributes could not possibly conflict (De Princ I.I.6).
This view of punishment as restorative is found throughout Origen’s many writings (e.g., De Princ II.10.6–8; Hom in Exod III.3; VIII.5–6; Hom in Jer I.15–16; VI.2; XII.5; Contra Celsum III.75; IV.72, 99; V.31). He holds that even death is purifying punishment (Comm in Matt 15.15; Hom in Lev 14.4). We already saw this view in Theophilus of Antioch, who held that physical death was inflicted after the fall so as to prevent fallen humans to sin forever and incur eternal punishment (To Autolycus II.26). Likewise, for Origen, eternal punishment is not possible for God, since by definition that could not be restorative. The Scriptural affirmation of aiōnios punishment (e.g., Matt 25:46) presents no challenge, for he is aware that aiōnios in Greek properly refers to the aeons and not eternity:
In the Scriptures “aeon” is sometimes recorded because the end is not known, but sometimes because the time period designated does not have an end in the present aeon, though it does end in the future. Sometimes a period of time or even the length of one man’s life may be designated as “aeon” (Comm in Rom VI.5.9)
“Lord, you who rule from aeon to aeon and beyond.” [Exod 15:18] As often as “from aeon to aeon” is said a length of time is indicated but there is some end. And if Scripture says “into another aeon,” certainly something longer is indicated, but an end is set. And as often as “the aeons of the aeons” is mentioned some termination is indicated, although perhaps unknown to us, nevertheless established by God. But Scripture adds in this passage: “and beyond.” No sense of any termination or end remains. (Hom in Exod VI.13)
Origen doesn’t follow Plato and the Greek philosophers of his own day in using aiōn and aiōnios to refer to absolute eternity. Instead, he follows the Scriptural usage of these terms to refer to a lengthy but not endless period of time – an “age” or “aeon.” [3] God is called “aeonian” because he rules and acts within history, within the aeons (contrary to the more deistic God of the philosophers); but Scripture also says, “and beyond,” with reference to God’s rule and life. This shows that when the world reaches its telos, it will be “something more than an aeon... when all things are no longer in an aeon, but ‘God is all and in all’ [1 Cor 15:28]” (De Princ II.3.5).
If “aeonian punishment” has an end, then on what basis does Origen maintain that “aeonian life” will be endless? He gives two complementary answers to this inquiry. First, “aeonian life” is primarily a quality of life, not its duration; it is the quality of intimately knowing God and Jesus (Comm in Rom II.5.8; 7.4). We know that this is endless not because the word aiōnios is used – since that word has many meanings – but because other words like “always” (pantote) are used (VI.5.9). In another sense, however, aeonian life will end. Our knowledge of God and Christ within the aeons will be superceded by an even better life when the aeons end. Referencing the “aeonian tabernacle” of 1 Cor 5:1, he says that “there is a stage that is beyond this and superior to rational creatures. In that state, rational creatures will be in the Father and the Son, or rather in the Trinity” (Sel in Ps 60). For the Father is “beyond aeonian life” (Comm in John XIII.18–19).
The End as the So-Called Restoration
This topic naturally leads to Origen’s view of the end of history. For him, since the substance of every rational creature is fundamentally good, and God’s punishments are aimed at turning their corrupted wills back to the good, it is impossible that evil could exist forever. This belief wasn’t a result of the influence of Greek philosophy, but followed from his ‘orthodox’ polemics against the ‘gnostic’ heretics. In fact, Plato himself believed that some sinners are “incurable” (e.g., Phaedo 113E2); Origen rejected this view on the Christian grounds that God is the Almighty Physician, so it is possible for him to cure any of his creatures, even the worst (De Princ III.6.5; cf. Contra Celsum VIII.72).
For Origen, the “restoration” (apokatastasis) of all rational beings is the goal to which all of history aims. In his commentary on John 1:1, with reference to the “beginning” in which the Logos “was,” he says regarding the corresponding “end”:
I think the stopping point and goal [telos] is the so-called restoration, because no one is left as an enemy then, if indeed the statement is true, “For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet. And the last enemy to be destroyed is death.” [1 Cor 15:25–26] For at that time those who have come to God through the Logos who is “with him” [John 1:1] will have the contemplation of God as their only activity, that, having been accurately formed in the knowledge of the Father, they may all thus become a son, since now the Son alone has known the Father [Matt 11:27]. (Comm in John I.91–93)
Later in his commentary, he states that the telos will be simultaneous with Christ’s coming, citing 1 Cor 15:23–24 (Comm in John XXXII.27–30). The fact that he says that the end is the “so-called” restoration implies that he is relating something that has been previously taught.
One of his sources is clearly 1 Corinthians 15:24–28, which actually refers to the subjection of God’s enemies as the telos. This passage is Origen’s primary Scriptural basis for his belief in the universal restoration, and he devotes a large portion of his On First Principles to exegeting this text (De Princ I.6; III.5.6–6.8). He thinks that the subjection of God’s enemies refers to their salvation for two reasons. First, because it is explicitly said in Scripture that subjection to God is salvation (De Princ I.6.1; cf. Ps 62:1). Second, because this same subjection is applied to Christ. Contrary to the “heretics,” who “deprecate using the term subjection in regard to the Son,” the subjection of the Son can be nothing but “good and salutary,” and includes the “perfect restoration of the entire creation” which will at that time have been incorporated into the body of Christ (De Princ III.5.7; cf. Eph 1:10).
Another source for Origen’s belief in the universal restoration is likely Acts 3:21, which connects the “restoration of all things” to Christ’s return. In fact, he references this passage to support his view that the “perfect telos” of the world will be the restoration (De Princ II.3.5; cf. Comm in Matt 17.19). Finally, a third source for his belief that the “telos is the so-called restoration” is likely his predecessor Clement of Alexandria, who also said that Paul “teaches that the telos is the restoration we hope for” (Stromata II.22). We shouldn’t discount the influence of Clement, who was a clear universalist, on Origen, although we also shouldn’t overemphasize this influence (it’s unlikely that Origen actually studied under Clement, as has often been thought).
Origen’s belief in universal restoration is not only based in Scripture, but also philosophy – that is, Christian philosophy, not Greek philosophy. As noted above, his beliefs that evil is non-being and that God’s punishment is restorative lead directly to his universalism. It is possible for a soul to become so fully integrated around goodness that its good will is “changed into nature”; this is precisely what happened with Christ’s human soul (De Princ II.6.5–7). In fact, this is precisely why, after the restoration of all beings, there will be no more fall, and Christ will not need to be sacrificed a second time (Origen considers this thought to be absurd). All beings will have been made perfect in the love of Christ, and “love never fails” (Comm in Rom V.10.12–16).
But it is not possible for a soul to become fully integrated around evil in this way; evil is non-being, and such a soul would cease to exist. Scripture affirms that God “created all things so that they might exist” (Wis 1:14), so he would not allow any of his creatures to pass completely into non-being (De Princ III.6.5; Hom in Jer I.16; Contra Celsum V.22). Death and life are two contraries, one is the privation of the other; therefore, they cannot both be of eternal duration, for that would make them ontologically equal. “Therefore it is certain that if life is eternal, death cannot be eternal” (Comm in Rom V.7.8). It’s interesting that Origen opposes his universalism to annihilation, and not to eternal torment; this may reflect the state of Christian eschatological discourse in his day, since (as I showed in my previous posts) universalism and annihilation/conditionalism were the two main options at this time.
Did Origen believe that even the devil would be saved, then? Some scholars have actually argued that he didn’t, based on a handful of passages where he speaks of the devil’s destruction (e.g., Hom in Lev XI.11.2; Contra Celsum VI.44). [4] This seems impossible to maintain in light of his repeated forceful statements that all rational beings will be restored, that God will be truly “in all” without exception. But one of his statements about the devil is particularly confusing:
They say that I claim that the father of wickedness and perdition, and of those who are cast out of the kingdom of God, namely, the devil, is to be saved. This is something which not even a madman and someone who is manifestly insane can say. (quoted in Rufinus, On the Falsification 7)
Does he contradict himself here? Not if we understand the nuances of his position. For Origen, “the devil” is a title that properly refers not to the substance of the one who became the devil, which (qua creature of God) is fundamentally good, but to his evil choices and will (De Princ I.5.2; Comm in John II.97; Contra Celsum IV.65). The destruction of the “last enemy” will not involve the destruction of his substance, but the destruction of his hostile will, so that he is no longer devil (De Princ III.6.5). It would indeed be wrong to maintain that “the devil” will be saved, since that would mean that his evil will is saved, which is nonsense – but that’s precisely the view that his opponent Candidus falsely attributed to him (which he was refuting in the above passage), since Candidus was a ‘gnostic’ who believed that the devil was evil in his nature.
In his polemics with the ‘gnostics,’ Origen did not oppose universal restoration to freedom of choice, but held that it is certain precisely because of freedom of choice (along with the asymmetry of good and evil). Freedom of choice is why it will be possible even for demons and the devil to return to the Good in future aeons (De Princ I.6.3; Comm in Rom V.10.13–14). The reason why all will ultimately be restored eternally is that good, unlike evil, can become nature for a rational being, as it did for Christ’s human soul. The love of Christ shown in his sacrifice is strong enough to fully integrate every creature within the Good (Comm in Rom V.10.12–18). Thus, despite his later critics, Origen’s universalism was in fact centered around Christ’s sacrifice and creatures’ freedom of choice.
Although he clearly expounded universal restoration in his theological treatises, he was pastorally concerned that teaching this doctrine aloud would cause weaker brethren to sin. In his polemic against the pagan philosopher Celsus, Origen makes a brief mention of the purificatory nature of punishment, but says that these remarks “are neither to be made to all, nor to be uttered on the present occasion,” because of those who have difficulty restraining from sin (Contra Celsum VI.26). He even held that this same pastoral concern is why Paul said that “many” would be saved rather than “all men” in Rom 5:15 (Comm in Rom V.1.5–7). This should be kept in mind when we’re investigating the eschatology of those who were influenced by Origen; they may have kept their belief in universalism out of their pastoral and apologetic writings for this purpose.
Origen’s Influence
Now that we’ve covered Origen’s Christian universalism in depth, let’s consider both the people who influenced him and those that he later influenced. There is a misconception that he was first and foremost a philosopher and only secondarily a Christian, and that he was heavily influenced by Middle Platonism. I don’t see this ‘Platonism’ in his writings to any great extent.
Origen explicitly rejected Plato’s thesis of an external world of Forms (De Princ II.3.6). His concept of time was more influenced by Stoicism than Platonism, and even then he staunchly opposed the Stoic idea of an eternal succession of identical aeons (De Princ II.3.4; Contra Celsum IV.67–68). [5] His most Platonic view was the privation theory of evil, but he developed this primarily on the basis of Scripture, not philosophical arguments. His universalism was in opposition to Plato, who thought that some sinners were “incurable” (e.g., Phaedo 113E2). In my opinion, Origen would best be classified not as a Platonist, but as a uniquely Christian philosopher (one of the first of his kind).
Origen had a great influence on the early church after him, especially the Eastern part of the church. He deeply influenced Athanasius of Alexandria and the three Cappadocian Fathers, who were the primary members of the victorious pro-Nicene faction in the fourth-century conflicts. In the late fourth century, Jerome wrote, “none but the ignorant will deny [Origen] to be the greatest teacher of the Church after the apostles” (On Hebrew Names pref.). This shows just how great his influence was, before the later controversies that regrettably marred his reputation within Christian tradition.
Nearly all of the doctrines that were attributed to him in the sixth-century Origenist controversy were doctrines that he never held, and even explicitly refuted. For example, Origen did not believe in the idea of transmigration of souls – that souls pre-existed their bodies incorporeally – and actually called out this doctrine by name as false (Comm in Matt XIII.1). He believed that every being except for the Trinity is essentially embodied (De Princ II.2.2; 3.2–3; IV.4.8), and that the resurrection body maintains continuity of identity with the mortal body (De Princ II.10.1–3; III.6.6). Nor did he believe that Christ will be sacrificed again; he considered this an absurdity (Comm in Rom V.10.12–16). This should suffice to show that Origen himself was not an ‘Origenist’; his views were badly distorted up to the sixth century, and he was wrongly condemned.
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[1] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christinae 65 (2011): 21-49.
[2] Mark Edwards, “Origen of Alexandria,” in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Patristics, ed. Ken Parry (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2015), 98-110.
[3] See my own blog post series on the usage of aiōn and aiōnios throughout Scripture.
[4] Lisa R. Holliday, “Will Satan Be Saved? Reconsidering Origen’s Theory of Volition in Peri Archon,” Vigiliae Christinae 63 (2009): 1-23; Michael S. Domeracki, “The Unchanging Mind: Origen’s Lifetime Argument and The Dissolution of the Devil.”
[5] P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time (Boston: Brill, 2006).
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