In the last post, we looked at one aspect of classical theism (divine timelessness) that’s been rejected by many non-classical theists in the modern era. I gave several reasons to believe in divine timelessness and showed that it could be conceived in a way that’s logically coherent. In this post, we’ll take a look at another controversial aspect of classical theism, the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is the claim that God has no physical or metaphysical parts. If God is simple, then he’s identical to everything that’s intrinsic to him, including his action and all his properties. Why do classical theists believe such a strange doctrine, and is it even logically coherent?
Defining Divine Simplicity
First, let’s define and disambiguate several different understandings of divine simplicity (based on O’Connor 2023). The weakest version of divine simplicity (WDS) says that God has no physical parts, but makes no commitments about his metaphysical parts. Virtually all philosophical theists agree with this thesis, with the exception of pantheists. The strongest version of divine simplicity (SDS) says that God has no metaphysical parts whatsoever, so that he’s really identical to everything intrinsic to him. This view was held by classical theists like Anselm, Aquinas, Maimonides, and Ibn Sina (Avicenna). In between these two views is Duns Scotus’ claim that God has metaphysical parts, but they are inseparable so that we can’t really distinguish them; let’s call this inseparability divine simplicity (IDS). Here, I’ll be defending the SDS view.
Furthermore, a few notes about mereology (the metaphysics of parts). A proper part refers to a part that isn’t identical to the whole, and an improper part refers to a ‘part’ that is identical to the whole. So my heart and lungs are proper parts of myself, and (if improper parthood is a coherent concept) I am an improper part of myself. SDS denies that God has proper parts, but God can have improper parts that we may be able to conceptually distinguish. So even though God is really identical to his omnipotence and his omniscience (according to SDS), we can distinguish between God’s omnipotence and his omniscience insofar as we creatures imperfectly mimic God in different ways that we call ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ (cf. Aquinas, ST 1.13.4).
Arguments for Divine Simplicity
The primary motivation for divine simplicity is that it seems to follow from God being the first cause of all other things, which is central to classical theists’ natural theology. This doesn’t merely mean that God is first in time, so that he set everything in motion and then stepped aside (like in deism), but that he’s the most foundational reality which explains everything apart from himself; nothing is more fundamental than him. Most philosophical theists would agree with this concept of God (and it follows from perfect being theology – a being that explains all else is more perfect than one that only explains some other things), but disagree on what it entails.
If God is indeed the most fundamental reality, this seems to entail that he has no proper parts. Every physical composite depends on the existence of its proper parts at least to some extent – animals depend on the existence of their organs, organs depend on the existence of cells, cells on molecules, molecules on atoms, atoms on fundamental particles. If we’re realists about metaphysical parts, then metaphysical composites also depend on their proper parts – Aristotelian material substances depend on their form and matter; electrons depend on the existence of the property of negative charge; and so on. But God doesn’t depend on anything that isn’t himself; he is self-sufficient. Therefore he has no proper parts. We can formalize this argument as follows:
1. Every composite depends on its proper parts. (premise)
2. No composite is identical to any of its proper parts. (definition)
3. God does not depend on anything that is not identical to himself. (premise)
4. Therefore, God is not composite. (from 1-3)
An objector may deny premise 1, but it’s difficult to see how this could be the case. It seems true by definition that a composite depends on its parts; even if it doesn’t depend on these parts exactly (for example, I could have a different kidney than I do), it depends on the existence of some parts, otherwise it wouldn’t be a composite. An objector may also modify premise 3 to say that God doesn’t depend on anything outside of himself, so that he could depend on parts intrinsic to him. But this seems to save God’s compositeness at the expense of admitting a more fundamental reality than God himself (namely, God’s parts), which abandons God’s self-sufficiency and first-causeness.
Finally, an objector to SDS could admit the truth of all the premises while still holding WDS rather than SDS, by being an anti-realist about metaphysical parts. If there’s no such thing as properties, then of course God doesn’t depend on his properties, so we can just say God has no physical parts and be done with it. But in addition to the high theoretical cost of this view, it’s unclear what advantages it has over SDS. After all, if there are no properties, then the apparently diverse properties of things are just different ways of conceiving one and the same reality – but that’s exactly what SDS proponents say about God’s apparently diverse properties!
Here’s another argument that supports SDS over WDS and IDS. Even if we grant that God could have proper parts, what explains why he has these proper parts and not others? If God’s properties are entities not identical to him, then it seems metaphysically possible for them to be combined in different ways. There could be a being that’s omnipotent but not loving, or omniscient but not immutable, and so on. We’re left with a sort of ‘Build-a-God’ station, and no solid reason why some properties are essential to God and not others. We can formalize this argument as follows:
5. God’s essential properties are proper parts of him. (premise for reductio ad absurdum)6. For every composite, there is an explanation why it has these proper parts and not others. (Principle of Sufficient Reason)
7. There is an explanation why God has these essential properties and not others. (from 5-6)
8. Nothing can explain its own essential properties. (premise)
9. No essential properties can explain themselves. (premise)
10. Nothing outside of God can explain his essential properties. (premise)
11. There is and is not an explanation why God has these essential properties and not others. (from 7-10)
This argument is deductively valid, and if the premises are true, it shows that God’s essential properties being proper parts leads to a contradiction. Few philosophical theists will want to deny premise 6 (a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason), and it seems intuitively true; otherwise God’s attributes will be unexplained by God or anything else. Premises 8-10 also appear intuitively true to me. Nothing can explain its own essential attributes (premise 8), because then it would be explanatorily prior to itself, which is impossible. It also seems intuitive that circular explanation is impossible, so the set of God’s essential properties can’t explain itself (premise 9). And premise 10 can only be denied at the expense of denying God’s self-sufficiency.
Finally, one last argument moves from the doctrine of creation ex nihilo to SDS (Juliano 2019). According to the traditional doctrine, God created all things without relying on anything apart from himself. But if God has proper parts that aren’t identical to him, then he must rely on something that isn’t himself (namely, his parts) in order to create. This argument can be formalized as follows:
12. If God’s creative action depends on something that is not identical to himself, then he cannot create ex nihilo. (premise)
13. If God has proper parts, then his creative action depends on his proper parts. (premise)
14. No composite is identical to any of its proper parts. (definition)
15. God does create ex nihilo. (premise)
16. Therefore, God has no proper parts. (from 12-15)
The same argument holds for the heterodox view of creation ex Deo (out of God), which also holds that the only prerequisite for creation is God himself. Most philosophical theists won’t want to deny premises 12 and 15, so an objector will likely attack premise 13. But this premise is just as intuitive as premise 1 (“Every composite depends on its proper parts”), and can even be seen as an extension of that premise, insofar as a thing’s action depends on its existence.
We’ve now seen a few arguments that provide us with good (but defeasible) reasons to believe that SDS is true, that is, that God has no metaphysical proper parts and is identical to everything intrinsic to himself. There are even more arguments that I didn’t have the space to present here. For example, Aquinas’ argument in De Ente et Essentia moves from the distinction between essence (what something is) and existence (that something is) to show that God’s essence is identical to his act of existence (Kerr 2014; Koons 2023). If this is correct, then God’s essence is simple, because existence itself is absolutely simple and fundamental. However, if SDS is logically incoherent, as many analytic theologians today claim, then we must have gone wrong somewhere. Is it coherent to say that God is simple?
The Coherence of Divine Simplicity
Objection #1: SDS makes God a property
The most common objection that is raised against SDS is that it makes God identical to a property, but properties are merely abstract (not causally effective), whereas God is concrete (causally effective), and so SDS must be false. However, this assumes a metaphysical framework that most classical theists wouldn’t accept. Classical theists tend to be Aristotelians, who agree (contrary to Platonism) that properties considered in the abstract are abstract (such as redness), but believe that properties of things are concrete (such as this pillow’s redness).
Indeed, it doesn’t make much sense to me to say that every property is abstract. If this pillow’s redness is abstract (not causally effective), then how is it that we can detect its redness? Perhaps you will object that redness is reducible to interactions between particles, and a pillow’s redness simply refers to the wavelength of the photons that it emits. But you can substitute redness for your favorite fundamental property. Surely this photon’s wavelength is something detectable, and therefore concrete, as is this electron’s negative charge. And if properties of things are concrete, then it no longer seems quite so incoherent to say that God is identical to God’s omnipotence (for example).
Another model of SDS, which doesn’t rely on controversial Aristotelian metaphysics, is “Divine Truthmaker Simplicity” (DTS), which is defended by Jeffrey Brower (2008) and Tim Pawl (2019). This model relies on truthmaker theory, which is the view that when we refer to a thing’s property (F-ness), we’re actually talking about the truthmaker in virtue of which that thing is F. So this pillow’s redness actually refers to the wavelengths of the photons it emits. In this case, God is identical to his properties because he’s the one truthmaker for all of them. God is identical to his omnipotence because he’s the very thing in virtue of which he is omnipotent. In my opinion, DTS is inferior to the Aristotelian view, but it’s probably more palatable to modern analytic philosophers.
Objection #2: A simple God can’t be creator
A second objection to SDS is that if God is simple, he can’t be our creator or redeemer. After all, if God is identical to his properties, he must be identical to his properties of being creator and being redeemer. But God is self-sufficient, not depending on anything apart from himself, so his very being can’t depend on creation or redemption. Furthermore, God could have chosen not to create, so his property of being creator is contingent, and if he’s identical to it he must also be contingent. This absurd conclusion shows that God can’t be simple.
The solution provided by Aquinas and other classical theists is controversial: that God isn’t really related to us. To be clear, this doesn’t mean that God isn’t our creator and redeemer, or that he doesn’t love us. In Aquinas’ metaphysics, a real relation refers to a relation that causally affects both relata, whereas a relation of reason is a relation that does not affect either relatum, and a mixed relation is a relation that affects one relatum but not the other. For example, when I learn a fact about Thomas Aquinas, that creates a relation between me and Aquinas, but one that only causally affects me and not Aquinas. God creating and redeeming us intrinsically affects us, but not him, so it’s a mixed relation. Thus, when we call God “creator” and “redeemer,” this describes a relation between us and God, but not something intrinsic to God, so his properties of being creator and being redeemer are not intrinsic to him and therefore not identical to him (ST 1.13.7).
We can translate this into modern analytic philosophy using the language of Cambridge properties. A Cambridge property is an extrinsic property that doesn’t refer to an intrinsic fact about a thing. So my property of being taller than Abby is a Cambridge property, because if Abby were to grow taller than me, this property would change without anything intrinsic to me changing. God’s properties of being creator and being redeemer are Cambridge properties, since they describe a change in us and not in God. Divine simplicity doesn’t require God to be identical to his Cambridge properties, so the second challenge to SDS fails.
Objection #3: A simple God can’t have many ideas
A third objection against SDS is based on God’s ideas. In order to intentionally create a universe with multiple, composite things, he must have multiple ideas in his mind (e.g., the idea of me and of you). But if ideas are real things that are intrinsic to a mind, and God is identical to everything intrinsic to him, it seems that he could only have one idea. This objection, like the previous one, was already known to Aquinas (ST 1.15.2). Importantly, this isn’t about God’s knowledge of creation (see below), but about his ideas which are logically prior to creation.
There are a few responses that can help the SDS proponent here. First, God’s ideas might not be propositional (e.g., thoughts like x is possible and y is possible) but rather experiential, in an analogous way to our raw sensory data (Panchuk 2021). Second, as Aquinas argued, God’s essential act of knowing is knowing his own essence. Since God’s essence is existence itself, unlimited perfection, by knowing his essence he knows all the ways that his essence can be imperfectly imitated, and thus knows all possible things. Finally, though God’s ideas have multiple objects, he can know them all by a single mode/act of knowing, which for Aquinas is his act of knowing his own essence. (Think of many lines that all originate at a single, simple geometrical point.) This model shows that it’s possible for a simple God to have many ideas, although it’s of course impossible for mere creatures to fully understand God’s thoughts.
This model can also help us to understand how it’s possible for God to know things about creation. We know due to divine simplicity that God’s knowledge isn’t propositional, but rather experiential, which is both richer and more direct than propositional knowledge. Furthermore, if God is simple, his intellect is really the same as his will, which means that he knows that things are true by willing them to be true. He doesn’t merely create and then wait to see what happens, as if he were causally affected by creation, but he knows by creating. Thus, he knows me as intimately as I know myself (or even moreso), inasmuch as he actively wills all of my conscious states. God’s knowledge is more, not less, perfect than ours because of his simplicity and impassibility (Dolezal 2023).
Objection #4: SDS contradicts divine freedom
One last common objection is that SDS leads to modal collapse. If God’s action is identical to God, and God is necessary, then it seems that he couldn’t do otherwise than create this world exactly as it is, so everything necessarily exists as it does. The standard response, made by Aquinas and others, is that creation is a Cambridge relation of God (see above), so a difference in creation doesn’t make a difference intrinsic to God. (Per Aristotelian metaphysics, the change brought about by an action is in the patient and not the agent, so an agent can produce different effects without changing intrinsically.) The objector, however, can respond that this moves the issue back further: If a change in creation doesn’t reflect a change in God, how is it that he can intentionally will this creation and not another?
A possible answer is that God’s act of willing/creating the world, unlike our acts of willing, is direct and immediate (not mediated by anything intrinsic to God) so it’s fully extrinsic to him. As long as God has reasons to create or not create, his creation of the world is indeterministic but not an unexplained brute fact. Another response is to point out that this is a problem for every theist – how to derive contingent reality from a necessary God – and it’s only a matter of whether we say this indeterminism is intrinsic to God or (as SDS proponents claim) extrinsic to him. If we accept libertarian free will as a possibility, then humans can also intentionally bring about different effects without any intrinsic difference (Shields 2024).
From a different perspective, an SDS proponent might simply accept that creation really is necessary, while still being wholly dependent on God for its existence. God’s act of creation would still be free in the compatibilist sense, since his action isn’t constrained by anything apart from him. This move is especially open to Reformed and Islamic theologians who already hold to compatibilist rather than libertarian free will (Andani and College 2022; Pedersen and Lilley 2022). Thus, divine simplicity doesn’t challenge divine freedom. However, a theologian’s answer to this objection depends on if they hold a libertarian or a compatibilist view of free will; either way, it’s possible for God’s act of creation to be free in their preferred sense.
Conclusion
In this post, I provided a handful of arguments for the strong doctrine of divine simplicity and gave answers to the four common objections made against this doctrine. Does this have any application to our devotion and spiritual life? I think it does, and not only because thinking philosophically about God is part of loving him with all our mind (Mark 12:29). First, it helps us to see just how transcendent God really is compared to us. We can’t possibly understand his experiences and thoughts (Job 26:14; Isa. 55:8-9; Rom. 11:33-34); at best, we can come up with highly imprecise models of divine cognition that are merely analogous to our cognition. God’s simplicity also gives us a philosophical foundation to believe that there aren’t conflicting tendencies in him, so that (for example) his love and wrath are somehow ‘balanced’ against one another. Everything that God is, he is so fully, as the apostle John wrote, “God is light and in him there is no darkness at all” (1 John 1:5).
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