The Restoration of All: Universalism in Early Christianity (part 6)

Part 5: Third-Century Fathers

Fourth Century Fathers (part 1)

    In the past few posts, we’ve examined the views of all the major church fathers about the final destiny of unbelievers up to the beginning of the fourth century. It’s clear that there was no widespread consensus on this topic, although universalism virtually became the consensus of the eastern church during the third century. Now let’s look at the views of the church during the first half of the fourth century. At this time, the spotlight was on Christological and trinitarian issues, not eschatology, although these issues were intertwined (as we’ll see).

Eusebius of Caesarea

    Eusebius was the bishop of Caesarea in Palestine from ca. 314 to 339. He was a student of Pamphilus, his predecessor as bishop, who was also a staunch supporter of Origen; together they wrote a five-book defense of Origen’s theology (see the last post in this series). Pamphilus’ influence on him was so great that he even referred to himself as Eusebius “of Pamphilus.” Eusebius is best known as the author of a ten-book Church History, for which he is titled “Father of Church History.” However, he was also a theologian in his own right, who played a large role in the conflict surrounding the AD 325 Council of Nicaea. In fact, he presented his own formula of faith at that council, which (after some minor additions) became the first edition of the Nicene Creed! [1] But because he came to be viewed as a ‘subordinationist’ rather than an orthodox trinitarian, his theological views were suppressed, even though he was canonized as a saint. [2]

    Eusebius had a deep respect for Origen, which he inherited from his teacher and predecessor. In his Church History, he considered the entire life of Origen to be worth reporting, “even so to speak from his swaddling clothes” (VI.2.2). One of the doctrines that Eusebius drew from him was his universalist reading of 1 Corinthians 15:24–28, which he expounds toward the end of his Church Theology:

[I]n the meantime [before the telos], seeing as [the enemies] are not worthy of this, having taken upon himself, like a common Savior of all, the correction of the imperfect and care of those in need of healing, he exercises his kingship, putting the enemies of the kingdom under his feet... When he places the enemies under his feet, he will, however, establish those worthy of his kingdom in everlasting life, for at that time even death, the last enemy of all, will be destroyed. For when no one dies anymore, and those who are worthy of the kingdom will live in eternal life, death, of course, will no longer exist, since it will no longer have anyone to kill. When these have been suitably prepared, all holy ones will be subjected with a saving subjection to the Son of God... After the consummation of all things, when the new age has come, he will no longer dwell in some few of them, but in all, who are then worthy of the kingdom of heaven. Thus in this way he will be “all in all”. (Ecc Theol III.15–16)

    Here we see Eusebius’ belief that the punishment of Christ’s enemies during his reign will be corrective; that the subjection of the enemies is a “saving subjection”; and that at the telos, God will no longer dwell “in some few of them, but in all,” who will be made worthy. Compare Origen’s statement that “not only in some few or in many, but in all God will be all” (De Princ III.6.3). Eusebius presents this interpretation in the context of his polemic against Marcellus of Ancyra, who postulated an end to Christ’s human reign based on this passage. In response, he answers that the subjection in 1 Cor 15 is not forced, nor a unification in which personal identity is confused, but “the obedience that comes from free choice and the glory and honor that all beings will give to him as Savior and King of all” (Ecc Theol III.15.5). The Father will dwell in all who are ruled by the Son, so that all people are unified in “community of glory” with the Trinity (III.18–19).

    This same view is found across Eusebius’ other writings. In his comments on the Transfiguration account in Luke, he says that in the end, “it will no longer be as before when only three disciples... fell on their faces in fear, but ‘every knee will bend in heaven and on earth and under the earth.’” In his comments on Isaiah 25, in line with the Septuagint reading, he interprets the punishment as purificatory and, ultimately, resulting in the restoration of humanity; the final destruction will belong to “death” and “evil demon[s],” not humanity. Eusebius frequently uses the Greek term aidios (“eternal”) to refer to eschatological life, but only the term aiōnios (“aeonian”) to refer to punishment, in line with the Scriptural usage. [3] Based on this, we can confidently say that he was a universalist.

Marcellus of Ancyra

    Marcellus was the bishop of Ancyra in the early to mid fourth century, and he played a large role in the post-Nicene theological conflicts. [4] He fought alongside Athanasius of Alexandria against the ‘Arians,’ but his views were later condemned for falling into the opposite heresy of modalism. Furthermore, based on his interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15:24–28, he believed that Christ’s human reign would eventually end (although God would continue to reign through his Logos). This doctrine was staunchly opposed by Eusebius of Caesarea and others, whose view ultimately won out, resulting in the addition of the phrase “whose kingdom will have no end” to the Nicene Creed.

    Despite his dispute with Eusebius over modalism and the telos of Christ’s reign, these two theological heavyweights of the fourth century appear to have agreed on the universal restoration. Eusebius quotes Marcellus as saying,

What else does the phrase “until the time for restoration” wish to convey to us than the coming age, in which all beings must be completely restored?... [I]n the time of the restoration of absolutely all [apantōn], even creation itself will pass from bondage to liberty, for [Paul] says that “the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the sons of God” (Contra Marcellum II.4.11)

    Based on the surviving fragments of Marcellus’ Contra Asterium, he – like Origen – saw Christ’s body as uniting the whole of fallen humanity, for the purpose of restoring that humanity (frags. 107, 111, 113 Klostermann). [5] Because the Logos assumed humanity for this purpose (and not for himself), when all of his enemies have been subjected and all beings are restored, there will be no need for him to remain incarnate (117 Klostermann). If the disputed work De Incarnatione et contra Arianos was written by Marcellus, this provides an even more explicitly universalist reading of 1 Cor 15:24–28, where subjection is clearly interpreted as salvific and all humans, including those who are now enemies, are said to become full members of Christ’s body (19). [5]

Athanasius of Alexandria

    Athanasius was the bishop of Alexandria throughout the mid fourth century. During this time, he violently opposed ‘Arianism’ to the extent that he was accused of murder at one point. Despite his controversy in his own day, he came to be seen as the hero of the post-Nicene conflicts, titled “Pillar of the Church” and “Defender of Orthodoxy.” Probably due to his Alexandrian background, Athanasius was deeply influenced by Origen, whom he titled “the Hardworking” and even “miraculous” (thaumastos; Socrates, EH VI.13). Athanasius composed a letter defending Dionysius of Alexandria, an Origenian, against charges of ‘heresy’ (De Sententia Dionysii); he wrote a biography in praise of Anthony “the Great,” another Origenian (Vita Antonii); and he appointed the Origenian universalist Didymus the Blind (see below) to the head of the Alexandrian catechetical school.

    At the beginning of his De Incarnatione (ca. AD 330), Athanasius argues that since the good God created the world from nothing, evil is therefore ontologically nothing, and those who fully integrate themselves around evil would pass into non-being (3–4). This sets up the reason for the incarnation: God could not allow any of his rational creatures to fall into non-being; it would not be “worthy of God’s goodness” (6.4–10). The same argument was presented by Origen (see my post on his views), for whom only universal restoration is “worthy of the goodness of the God of the universe” (Comm in John VI.296). Athanasius speaks frequently in De Incarn., his Orationes contra Arianos, and his festal letters (see esp. letter 10.4.8–9) about the salvation and restoration of all people due to the incarnation and Christ’s death. This could be understood as referring merely to unlimited atonement, but in light of the Origenian flavor of his argument, should probably be understood as actual universalism.

    Athanasius interprets the aeonian fire as corrective in his exposition of the Psalms. God sends the nations into the aeonian fire and tells them to perish, “so that they may revive and correct themselves” (Exp in Ps IX.16). He knows that aiōn and aiōnios don’t refer strictly to eternity, but rather to the aeons, since in the same passage he glosses eis ton aiōna as “in the next aeon” (neō aiōni). Across his works, Athanasius frequently uses the Greek term that means strictly “eternal” (aidios), but never applies it to punishment. [6] In his commentary on Luke 10:22, he says that those who blaspheme Father, Son, or Holy Spirit will be “liable to the severest chastisement,” punished in this aeon and the next one, but God is still able to bring them to repent (6). The purpose of the fire that Christ sends is “that evil be entirely consumed in all people, and the soul... purified” (festal letter 3.4.8). It’s in this sense that we should interpret his references to aeonian fire in De Incarn. and elsewhere, so he was most likely a universalist.

Didymus the Blind

    Didymus “the Blind,” also known as Didymus “the Seer,” was appointed by Athanasius to the head of the Alexandrian catechetical school in the mid-fourth century and remained there until his death in 398. According to his student Jerome, he referred to Origen as “the second teacher of the church after the apostles.” Unfortunately, when Origen was condemned in the sixth century as a result of the ‘Origenist’ controversy, Didymus’ works were also condemned, so we have only fragments of his exegetical writings. From what we do have, it’s clear that he was a universalist. [7]

    Didymus, in his comments on 1 Cor 15:24–28, holds to the same interpretation as Origen: “death is destroyed in that every soul now subject to death, which is joined to evil, will be joined to Christ” (Comm in 1 Cor 7–8). Also in his comments on John 17:1–2, he emphasizes that the Father gives all beings to Christ, “that no being handed to him may perish”; they will all be saved, and there will no longer be sin nor any need for punishment. This is because the purpose of punishment is not retribution, but correction, to consume “not creatures, but certain conditions and habits” (Comm in Ps 20–21 XXI.15). Indeed, even the devil is not evil by nature, but by his habits, and even physical death was instituted as a restorative punishment (Comm in Gen IIB.109–116).

    Like the other Greek fathers of his day, Didymus is well aware that aiōnios does not mean strictly “eternal.” It can mean “beginningless and endless” when applied to God, but it can also mean simply “imperishable” (and not beginningless), and it can also mean “the time that extends over the life of a human being” (Comm in Job LXXVI.11ff). The ultimate condition of humanity will not be merely aeonian, but “salvation that is beyond the aeons [hyperaiōnios]” (Comm in Zach II.370). Thus, for Didymus, the Scriptural affirmation of aeonian punishment presents no challenge to the eventual restoration of all beings. Indeed, in Rufinus’ and Jerome’s later dispute over Origen, they agree that their teacher “Didymus the seeing prophet” was a universalist who believed even in the restoration of the rational being who became the devil (Rufinus, Apology Against Jerome I.43).

Macarius of Magnesia

    Macarius of Magnesia was a lesser-known Christian apologist of the mid-fourth century, whose only known work is the Apocriticus, a fictional debate between a pagan philosopher and a Christian. In the surviving portions of this work, he says that the end of this aeon will bring punishment for some (IV.13), but ultimately “all creatures will have a second and better beginning” (IV.16). We can be certain Macarius was a universalist, because the ninth-century Nikephoros of Constantinople complained that at the (now-lost) end of the fourth book of the Apocriticus, he taught “the crippled doctrines of the impious and apopleptic Origen... that the chastisement threatened and prepared by God for impious people in the time to come will come to an end” (Epikrisis 12).

Hilary of Poitiers

    Hilary was the bishop of Poitiers in the mid-fourth century, later titled “Hammer of the Arians” and “Athanasius of the West” for his staunch opposition to ‘Arianism.’ He was also one of the first Western fathers (with the possible exception of Novatian) to be influenced by Origen. According to Jerome, Hilary translated over 40,000 lines of Origen’s writings into Latin (Apology Against Rufinus I.2). His own commentaries on Job and the Psalms were heavily influenced by Origen’s commentaries (Jerome, De Viris Illustribus 100). He inherited some of Origen’s interpretations related to universalism, although he was not himself a universalist.

    For example, Hilary believed that Christ’s body incorporates the whole of humanity; this view is found all throughout his writings and is central to his soteriology. [8] He also held that God, strictly speaking, does not get angry or punish directly, but sin brings its own punishment. Thus the purpose of punishment is not retribution but repentance (Tract sup Ps II.16–22). In his commentary on Matthew, he offers the interpretation of the parable of lost sheep that the 100 sheep are the rational beings, and the lost sheep is human nature which will be restored (Comm in Matt XVIII.6). The same interpretation was proposed by Origen and Methodius of Olympus. Finally, Hilary also believed that the “subjection” in 1 Cor 15:24–28 is salvific, and used this to counter the ‘Arian’ interpretation of the Son’s subjection to God (De Trin XI.21–49).

    In spite of all this, Hilary was an infernalist and not a universalist. Although Christ’s body incorporates all humans, people can cut themselves off from this unity through their unbelief. [9] Hilary speaks of “eternal” (aeternum) punishment throughout his tractates on the Psalms, and doesn’t seem to consider that this is translated from aiōnios which doesn’t mean strictly “eternal.” In his comments on 1 Cor 15:24–28, he states that the telos will bring an irrevocable state of punishment for the wicked (De Trin XI.27–29). The “enemies” who are subjected will be saved, but these refer only to the unbelieving Jews, of whom Paul says, “they are enemies for your sakes, but... beloved for the fathers’ sake” (Rom 11:28); therefore, “because they are beloved for the fathers’ sake, they are reserved for the subjection [and not the destruction]” (De Trin XI.32–34). However, Hilary of Poitiers’ attempted synthesis of Western infernalism with Eastern, Origenian universalism doesn’t appear to have spread beyond him.

Marius Victorinus

    Marius Victorinus was a prominent Roman Neoplatonist philosopher who converted to Christianity in the mid-fourth century, and thereafter became a staunch anti-‘Arian.’ The story of his conversion had a deep impact on the young Augustine (Confessions VIII.2.3–5). In his commentaries on Paul’s epistles, Victorinus frequently emphasizes the centrality of faith for salvation in Christ. In his comments on Phil 2:10, he says that every human will eventually confess Christ, and not only every human but every being in the universe; death has already been conquered for “those who believe in him,” and if all beings will confess Christ, death will be conquered for “all of these” (Comm in Phil 2.10 [1211A–B]). In his comments on Eph 1:10, he states,

For not all things which exist – and they include both these very things in the heavens and those above the earth – are restored in Christ; rather, those things which are in Christ [are restored], for there also exist other and alien things. Therefore whatever things are in Christ, these are restored and rise again, whether in the heavens or on the earth. [1245B–C]

At first glance, this may seem to be a denial of universal salvation, but in his Adversus Arium, he is quite clear that every being is in fact “in Christ,” because nothing could possibly exist outside of him who is “the subsistence of all existents” (Adv Ar I.36). Victorinus takes over the Origenian view that the “body of Christ,” the church, is in fact “all souls” (Comm in Eph 1.22–23 [1252A–D]), though this body is now divided and not all believe. The “other and alien things” which will not be restored in Christ must be evilness itself, which per Neoplatonist (and Christian) philosophy is really nothing at all.

    It is because of this that we can be certain that all will be “spiritualized” by Christ in the end, that is, “God will be ‘all in all,’ not only in each one, but in all, therefore all will be God [or ‘divine’], because all will be full of God” (Adv Ar I.39). Christ descended to the lower parts and ascended to heaven in order to perfect every being that could be saved, both human and angelic (Comm in Eph 4.10 [1274A–D]). Just like Origen, Victorinus holds that it is precisely the love of Christ that ensures a soul’s eternal stability in salvation (Comm in Eph 3.18 [1269B–C]). He may have gotten these ideas from Origen’s own writings, since he was proficient in Greek, or from the Eastern church where universalism was then prevalent. Either way, Marius Victorinus is an important Western voice in favor of a Christ-centric and faith-centric universal salvation in this period.

Aphrahat the Persian

    Aphrahat was a Syriac church father, possibly a bishop, who wrote in the mid-fourth century. His surviving works are called the Demonstrations, of which there are twenty-three. In book 8, he expounds his belief that those who die become “nothing” (VIII.2), and that their souls sleep until the resurrection when they are judged (VIII.17–22); the spirit of the righteous that returns to God when they die is precisely the Holy Spirit (VIII.23). Aphrahat refers to this doctrine of soul sleep as “our faith” (VIII.20) and even “the thinking of the whole church” (XXII.26), which provides an interesting window into the thanatology of the early Syriac church.

    In Aphrahat’s view, the sleep of the wicked will be restless, since they dream of their coming judgment (VIII.19). Repentance is impossible after this life; in the next world there will be justice without grace (VII.25–27; VIII.20), contrary to the Origenian view that God’s goodness and justice are the same. The very wicked will not even be judged, but will return to Sheol (sleep? non-existence?) as soon as they are resurrected (XXII.17). The rest of humanity will be judged and will receive varying degrees of either reward and honor or punishment and torment (XXII.18–22). Based on this, Aphrahat can be safely categorized as an infernalist, although a conditionalist with regard to the very wicked.

Ephrem the Syrian

    Ephrem was a Syriac church father who lived in Mesopotamia and eventually settled in Edessa, where he defended the pro-Nicene position against ‘Arians’ and ‘gnostic’ groups. Like Aphrahat, he believed that the state of the dead in Sheol is one of sleep (Carm Nis XLIII.14–16; Hymn de Par VII.2), since the body is necessary for the human being to have full existence (Hymn de Par VIII.4–7). Thanks to Christ’s death and resurrection, every human will be restored to life at the universal resurrection. [10] At that time, there will be “two ways” – each human will either go to Gehenna or Eden (e.g., Carm Nis LXXIII.4).

    There will be varying degrees of punishment for those in Gehenna, in accordance with their sins (Ep ad Publ 2–4). Those in Eden will no longer love or pity those in Gehenna, due to the Abyss in between which severs the love even of family members, but will marvel at the “extent these people have cut off all hope by committing such iniquity” (Hymn de Par I.12–14); indeed, “their punishment does not come to an end” (II.4). There will be resurrection from the first death in Sheol, but there is no escape from the second death in Gehenna (Carm Nis XLIII.15).

    On the other hand, Ephrem considers that “perhaps, for the wicked,” the punishment of Gehenna symbolizes the sinner’s conscience which is tormented by his own sins, and this for the purpose of “repentance of their soul” (Ep ad Publ 22). He believed that physical death was instituted as a restorative punishment to prevent eternal sin, “lest by eating of [the Tree of Life] and living forever, they would have to remain in a life of pain for eternity” (Comm in Gen II.35). He considers, with an attitude of humility and uncertainty, that God’s mercy and forgiveness extends even to those in Gehenna:

Blessed the sinner who has received mercy there [in Gehenna] and is deemed worthy to be given access to the environs of Paradise; even though he remains outside, he may pasture there through grace. As I reflected I was fearful again because I had presumed to suppose that there might be between the Garden and the Fire a place where those who have found mercy can receive chastisement and forgiveness.

Praise to the Just One who rules with his grace; he is the Good One who never draws in the limits of his goodness; even to the wicked he stretches forth in his compassion. His divine cloud hovers over all that is his; it drips dew even on that fire of punishment so that, of his mercy, it enables even the embittered to taste of the drops of its refreshment. (Hymn de Par X.14–15)

In his commentary on the gospels, he refers to the ‘unforgivable sin’ of blasphemy of the Spirit (Matt 12:32), and says that

God will require the retribution of the most serious sin in Gehenna... But not even this sin will prevent that a person may be justified eventually. When one will have made retribution in Gehenna, [God] will reward him for this in the Kingdom. (Comm in Diat X.4)

In one of his homilies on Christ’s descent to Sheol, he represents Death as saying to Satan, “perhaps due to mercy, Gehenna will be emptied, and you will remain there alone with your ministers” (Carm Nis LIX.8). Thus, it appears that Ephrem was a tentative or hopeful universalist, who believed (in spite of his more fearful statements elsewhere) that God might allow repentance in Gehenna, and eventually save all human beings in this way. [11]

Conclusion

    The first half of the fourth century saw universalism’s popularity increase further across the church. The leaders of the three main (non-‘Arian’) Nicene factions – the Eusebian ‘subordinationists,’ the Marcellian modalists, and the Athanasian trinitarians – all were universalists, believing in the eventual salvation of at least all humanity. Didymus the Blind held even to the ultimate salvation of the rational creature who became the devil. In the West, Hilary of Poitiers remained an infernalist, but incorporated aspects of Origenian universalism into his eschatology, including the restorative nature of punishment and the salvific nature of “subjection.” Marius Victorinus, another Western anti-‘Arian,’ was certainly a universalist. In the Syriac church, Aphrahat was both an infernalist and a conditionalist (with regard to the very wicked), and Ephrem was a tentative or hopeful universalist.

Next week: Fourth-Century Fathers (2/2)

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[1] See his letter to his church following the council.

[2] On the question of Eusebius’ subordinationism or anti-subordinationism, see Christopher Beeley, “Eusebius’ Contra Marcellum. Anti-Modalist Doctrine and Orthodox Christology,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 12 (2008): 433–52; Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigilae Christianae 65 (2011): 38–49.

[3] Ilaria Ramelli and David Konstan, Terms for Eternity (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2013), 142–57.

[4] R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005); which provides a detailed history of the fourth-century theological conflicts and Marcellus’ role in them.

[5] Joseph T. Lienhard, “The Exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 from Marcellus of Ancyra to Theodoret of Cyrus,” Vigilae Christianae 37 (1983): 341–47. Despite Lienhard’s argument, the attribution of De Incarnatione to Marcellus seems very plausible to me, given its clearly modalistic reading of certain passages and its affirmation that God will rule through the Logos after ruling through the human Christ. This unique combination of views strongly suggests a Marcellian origin.

[6] Ramelli and Konstan, Terms for Eternity, 157–72.

[7] Since there are no easily accessible English translations of Didymus’ writings, I’m relying on Ramelli’s translation in The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis for this section.

[8] Ellen Scully, Physicalist Soteriology in Hilary of Poitiers (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

[9] Scully, Physicalist Soteriology, 147–54.

[10] Thomas Buchan, “Blessed is He who has brought Adam from Sheol”: Christ’s Descent to the Dead in the Theology of Saint Ephrem the Syrian (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2014), 293–310.

[11] Buchan, “Blessed is He who has brought Adam from Sheol”, 318–27; Kees den Biesen, “The Irresistible Love of God. Two Syrian Church Fathers on Universal Salvation in Christ,” in Between the Cross and the Crescent (Rome: Pontifical Oriental Institute, 2018), 438–43.

The Restoration of All: Universalism in Early Christianity (part 5)

Part 4: Origen’s Universalism

Third-Century Eastern Fathers

    Now that we’ve looked in detail at Origen’s view of the eventual restoration of all, we can examine the eschatological views of the other third-century church fathers. As we’ll see, universalism became the dominant view in the eastern church over the third century, most likely due to Origen’s influence. All of the major church fathers in the East during this period had connections to Origen and were plausibly universalists. Let’s begin by looking at the views of Dionysius of Alexandria.

Dionysius “the Great”

    Dionysius “the Great” was the bishop of Alexandria from 248 to 264. He was a direct student of Origen at the catechetical school of Alexandria, and eventually succeeded him as leader of the school. The later Alexandrian church father Athanasius saw him as an illustrious predecessor, and was concerned to defend him against charges of heresy (see De Sententia Dionysii).

    Like Origen, Dionysius understood the term aiōn (and related phrase eis ton aiōna) to refer, not to “eternity” or “forever,” but to an indefinite and lengthy period of time, an “age” or “aeon.” Commenting on Ecclesiastes 1:4, which says that “the earth remains into the aeon” (eis ton aiōna), he replies, “Yes, into the aeon, but not into the aeons.” On Ecclesiastes 3:11, he comments, “the end of this aeon – that is, our present life – is a thing of which we are ignorant.”

    Dionysius believed that it is impossible for God to desire evil, but that he rather “wills to give us good exceedingly above what we ask or think... His will, therefore, is the perfect will, as the Beloved himself knew, and often he says that he has come to do that will” (Comm in Luke 22:48). Like Paul, he contrasts the death that comes through Adam with the resurrection of the dead that comes through “the new Adam,” Christ (Comm in Eph 3:4). In his limited surviving writings, there are no explicit affirmations of universal restoration, but I find it nearly impossible to believe that he wasn’t a universalist based on his closeness with Origen, his use of the word aiōn, and these few other statements of his.

Gregory Thaumaturgus

    Gregory “the Miracle-Worker” (Thaumaturgus) was the bishop of Neocaesarea in the mid-3rd century. He became a student of Origen early in his life, when both of them happened to be in the city of Caesarea in Palestine. In his public farewell oration to Origen before leaving Palestine, he considered this initial meeting to have happened by providence (Oration 4–5). His teacher clearly had a substantial and lasting impact on him and his theology. The later church father Basil of Caesarea held Gregory in high esteem, and said that by both friends and enemies of the church he “was regarded as a second Moses” (De Spiritu Sancto 74).

    Gregory Thaumaturgus used the terms aiōn and aiōnios in the same way that they are used throughout Scripture and by Origen, to refer to a lengthy and indeterminate period of time, an “aeon.” [1] Like them, he did not use aidios (“eternal”) to refer to punishment or death. On the contrary, it is the heathen who believe death to be “an eternal [aidion] evil which brings us to nothing,” and in doing so they ignore the judgment that comes after death (Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes 11). [Note that he does not say that this judgment results in hopeless punishment, only that there is judgment, on which Origen and all other patristic universalists agree.]

    In Gregory’s farewell oration to Origen, he refers to Christ as “the common Savior of all” and “the Savior of all people, even those who are half dead and despoiled, the Protector and Physician of all, the Logos, the tireless Keeper of all” (Oration 4; 17). If his Sectional Confession of Faith is authentic (which, however, seems unlikely), this is even more explicitly universalistic; the incarnation of the Logos took place for “the renewal of humanity... the salvation of (all) the world” (6; 19). The Holy Spirit has the power to “sanctify the whole creation,” and indeed Christ’s life was “for the sanctification of us all” and his resurrection “for the resurrection of us all” (18). In the fifth century, both Rufinus and Jerome in their dispute over Origen can agree that “the great Gregory of Pontus, a man of apostolic virtues” was a universalist (Rufinus, Apology Against Jerome I.43).

Pamphilus of Caesarea

    Pamphilus was the bishop of Caesarea in Palestine during the late third and early fourth centuries. In his youth, he traveled to Alexandria where he studied under Pierius, one of Origen’s successors as leader of the catechetical school who was even called “the Younger Origen.” When Pamphilus was in prison during the Diocletianic persecution (from AD 307–309), he composed a five-book apology for Origen together with his student and successor Eusebius, since Origen's ideas had already begun to come under fire in some circles. Pamphilus defended him against the charge of trinitarian heresy (Apology 38–85, 88–126), that he denied the bodily resurrection of the dead (127–149), that he denied the judgment of sinners (150–158), and that he believed in the pre-existence and transmigration of souls (159–188).

    Pamphilus quotes Origen’s statements about punishment being restorative while defending him against the charge that he denied punishment of sinners (Apology 153, 155). He repeats Origen’s Scriptural justification for this claim, citing the theme of punishment-and-restoration throughout the prophets (Isa 4:4; 47:14–15; 66:16–17; Mal 3:3). Unfortunately, without any explicit statements from Pamphilus on eschatology, we can’t be absolutely certain that he was a universalist, but it’s hard to imagine that he wasn’t, given his belief in restorative punishment and his closeness to Origen.

Methodius of Olympus

    Methodius was the bishop of Olympus in Lycia during the late third and early fourth centuries. Unlike the other third-century church fathers we’ve seen, he wasn’t an Origenian, but in fact an opponent of what he thought to be Origen’s views (which, as Pamphilus was careful to demonstrate, were not actually Origen’s views). He composed a book, On the Resurrection, in defense of the bodily resurrection against the supposedly Origenian incorporeal resurrection. Even so, his thought closely parallels Origen’s actual thought in some important respects, and he was very plausibly a universalist.

    In his defense of the resurrection, Methodius claims that physical death was instituted for a restorative purpose, “so that humanity might not be an undying or ever-living evil, as would have been the case if sin were dominant in him, as it had sprung up in an immortal body” (On the Resurrection I.4). And again, God put “an end to sin by means of death, lest humanity living as an immortal sinner, and sin living in him, should be liable to eternal curse... by means of [physical] death [God] frees his sons from [spiritual] death” (Symposium IX.2). We’ve already seen this idea – that death was instituted to prevent humanity from sinning eternally and thereby deserving eternal punishment – in Theophilus of Antioch and Origen. In addition to his belief in restorative punishment, Methodius held to the privation theory of evil in his polemics against the predestinationist ‘gnostics,’ arguing that every substance created by God is fundamentally good, and evil is a result of the free choices of rational creatures (On Free Will; cf. Symposium VIII.15–16).

    Methodius takes a very universalistic line in his Symposium on virginity. He interprets the marred and restored vessel of Jeremiah 18:3–4 as humanity, which was ruined by the sin of Adam and restored by Christ – who will find even the final lost sheep (interpreted as humanity), so that sin and condemnation are destroyed, and “the sentence... that had gone forth on all” is reversed, and in Christ “all will be made alive” (Symposium III.5–6). The ontological asymmetry of good and evil ensures that the latter will ultimately disappear (III.7). The closing hymn celebrates the end of death and ignorance, which is conceived as a return to the beginning (XI.2.21–22). His Oration on the Psalms ends with a declaration that, because of Christ’s death and resurrection, he will be “equally adored by all creatures, for to him every knee shall bow in heaven, on earth, and under the earth” (7).

Anthony “the Great”

    Anthony “the Great” was the first of the Desert Fathers in Egypt, and his outsize influence on Christian monasticism earned him the posthumous title “Father of All Monks.” Anthony was certainly exposed to and influenced by Origen’s writings, which spread widely in the Egyptian desert during the early monastic movement. [2] The later church father Athanasius of Alexandria, who was also a supporter of Origen, wrote a Life of St. Anthony which greatly influenced later monasticism. Fortunately, we have seven letters from Anthony to his followers which are probably authentic, so we can learn something of his thought.

    Anthony conceived of the original state of rational creatures as unity, and salvation as a return to that unity (Letter 2; 5; 6). He repeatedly speaks of salvation as restoration to the “first beginning,” which is to be “one in God” (Letter 2; 6). Not just humans, but angels, heavenly bodies, demons, the devil, and all other rational creatures share a common nature (Letter 5; 6). Every rational creature was made in the image of Jesus Christ, in virtue of which he is “the head of all creation and his body, the church” (Letter 6). Origen likewise held that Christ’s body, properly speaking, is the entire rational creation, which is why the subjection of every enemy constitutes the subjection of Christ to God (De Princ III.5.7; on 1 Cor 15:24–28). Anthony repeatedly speaks of the division of rational creation through sin as a “wound” to this body, which Christ came to heal; he came to teach us that “we are members one of another.”

    Anthony refers to some, including the demons, whose “portion is to be in hell,” who are “in this world... condemned to death” and prepared “to inherit gehenna” (Letter 6). The coming of Christ will bring punishment for some (Letter 2). Those who neglect their salvation may be deprived of aeonian life and the kingdom of light (Letter 5), and the wound of one who sins against God is “incurable” (Letter 4). But an “incurable” wound can still be cured by God; it “could not be healed by any creature, only by the goodness of the Father” (Letter 6). Origen also held “the goodness of God” to be the active agent of universal restoration (De Princ I.6.1; cf. III.6.5).

    In his first letter, Anthony distinguishes three types of believers: those who love God from their first calling, those who convert out of fear of punishment, and those who are converted through punishment, thereby “entering into knowledge... they also attain the true manner of life, like” the other two groups. God has “mercy shown to the whole creation, which in these members once was sick” (Letter 1). For “God always loves his creatures” (Letter 5), and “God always visits his creatures, and bestows his goodness upon them” (Letter 7). In addition to his belief in restorative punishment, Anthony held to the privation theory of evil, claiming that sin and evil are “foreign and unnatural to our substance,” which is fundamentally good (Letter 7). Based on all this, it’s very likely that Anthony the Great was an Origenian universalist.

Third-Century Western Fathers

    Based on what we’ve seen, universalism became the dominant view in the eastern church during the third century, thanks to the direct and indirect influence of Origen. But what about the third-century western church? Here we see a much wider range of views, corresponding to all three eschatological schools of thought (annihilationism, universalism, and infernalism). Probably thanks to Tertullian’s influence, along with the translation of aiōnios (“aeonian”) into Latin as aeternus (“eternal”), infernalism gained a wider purchase in the Latin-speaking church during this period.

Hippolytus of Rome

    Hippolytus was a prolific Christian commentator and theologian in the early third century, but not much is known for certain about his life. He may have been a bishop in Rome from ca. 222 to 235. Jerome says that Origen was himself influenced by Hippolytus to write his many commentaries on Scripture (De Viris Illustribus 61). The heresiological work Refutation of All Heresies is often attributed to him, but this work is anonymous, and it’s uncertain whether it was authored by the same person as Hippolytus’ commentaries.

    The author of the Refutation doesn’t propound a clear eschatological view, much less an infernalist one; in fact, this work was at first attributed to Origen. At the end, he gives a detailed description of the punishments that the ‘heretics’ can expect if they fail to repent (Refutation X.30), but given the polemical nature of the work, we can’t be sure if the author believed these punishments to be truly hopeless. In the same description, the author refers to these punishments as kolaston, which may carry the sense of restorative as opposed to retributive punishment (cf. Aristotle, Rhet 1369B; Clement, Strom VII.16). The author doesn’t cite universalism, infernalism, or annihilationism as ‘heresies,’ which suggests that these were acceptable theologoumena to him.

    In his commentaries, which are the only writings that definitely belong to him, Hippolytus speaks of the “aeonian fire of punishment” which will “consume” all but those who fear God (Comm in Dan IV.14.3). This punishment is not only aeonian, but “unending” (IV.12.1). In his commentary on Susannah, he glosses “aeonian punishment” with “death” (I.22.3), and this death “will never cease”. On the other hand, in Against Plato, which is doubtfully attributed to Hippolytus, the author provides a clearly infernalist vision of hell wherein “no death will deliver them from punishment” (3). Based on this, Hippolytus was most likely an annihilationist but possibly an infernalist.

Cyprian of Carthage

    Cyprian was the bishop of Carthage from AD 248 to 258 during the lapsi controversy, over whether Christians who had lapsed during Roman persecution could rejoin the church. Among his influences were Tertullian and the Latin apologist Minucius Felix, who was also an infernalist (Octavius 35). It seems that Cyprian was also an infernalist, based on what he wrote in his polemic against the anti-Christian proconsul of Africa Demetrianus:

When the day of judgment shall come, what joy of believers, what sorrow of unbelievers; that they should have been unwilling to believe here, and now that they should be unable to return that they might believe! An ever-burning Gehenna will burn up the condemned, and a punishment devouring with living flames; nor will there be any source whence at any time they may have either respite or end to their torments. Souls with their bodies will be reserved in infinite tortures for suffering... The pain of punishment will then be without the fruit of penitence; weeping will be useless, and prayer ineffectual. Too late they will believe in eternal punishment who would not believe in eternal life. (Treatise V.24)

This is as clear of an affirmation of infernalism as we could hope for, although we shouldn’t forget the polemical context. Cyprian also occasionally refers to the threat of “eternal punishment” in his letters (30.7; 54.14, 19; 76.6). Ilaria Ramelli points to Cyprian’s affirmation of restorative punishment, in the context of his promoting the restoration of the lapsi, as evidence that he might have been a universalist (Letter 51.22–23). [3] However, it seems clear to me that he’s talking about repentance in this life, before it’s too late. Therefore, he can be safely classified as an infernalist.

Novatian

    Novatian was a bishop of Rome in the year 251, during the schism in the western church over the lapsi controversy. Unlike Cyprian and the rest of the mainstream Latin church, he refused to readmit any lapsed Christians back into the church. Shortly after he became antipope, he was excommunicated, but the schismatic church he established (the “Novatianists”) survived for centuries afterward. Despite his extreme exclusivism about restoration in this life, however, his thought parallels that of Origenian universalists at some important points, which has led some scholars to argue that he was directly aware of Origen’s writings and perhaps even the first to translate them into Latin. [4]

    Much like them, Novatian viewed physical death as a restorative punishment that prevented humanity from incurring eternal guilt: “he is prevented from touching the tree of life... lest, living forever without Christ’s previous pardon of his sins, he should always bear with him for his punishment an immortality of guilt” (De trin 1). Moreover, he believed that rational creatures have freedom to choose good or evil, and that evil is not created by God but is a departure from God (De trin 1; 4). Finally, he also held that God’s anger and wrath are always intended for our restoration, “displayed for our medicine” (De trin 5). All of the elements of Origenian universalism are here. But unfortunately, Novatian doesn’t talk explicitly about universal restoration in his single surviving work.

Arnobius of Sicca

    Arnobius was a Christian apologist from Sicca in north Africa during the late third and early fourth centuries. His only surviving work is a seven-book apology for Christianity titled “Against the Heathen” (Adversus nationem). In this work, he gives perhaps the clearest exposition of annihilationism from the early church:

For [souls] are cast in [to the lake of fire], and being annihilated, pass away vainly in everlasting destruction. For theirs is an intermediate state, as has been learned from Christ’s teaching; and they are such that they may on the one hand perish if they have not known God, and on the other be delivered from death if they have given heed to His threats and proffered favors. And to make manifest what is unknown, this is man’s real death, this which leaves nothing behind. For that which is seen by the eyes is only a separation of soul from body, not the last end — annihilation; this, I say, is man’s real death, when souls which know not God shall be consumed in long-protracted torment with raging fire (Adv nat II.14)

Arnobius believes that the souls of the wicked will undergo lengthy torment and finally be annihilated, leaving nothing behind. He explicitly opposes this view to Plato’s concept of eternal torment, which he thinks is close to the truth, but still wrong since the soul is not immortal. For Arnobius, the idea that the soul is immortal is absurd and promotes moral laxity, since it removes the fear of annihilation, which is worse than torment (Adv nat II.14ff).

Lactantius

    Lactantius was a student of Arnobius of Sicca, also from North Africa, who wrote in the early fourth century. He became a Christian advisor to the emperor Constantine and was regarded very highly within the early and medieval church. Unlike his teacher Arnobius, however, Lactantius was clearly an infernalist who believed that some people would be tormented eternally. All people will be resurrected with indestructible flesh and tested with fire, but the fire will not harm the saints, and the wicked will feel pain from the fire forever (Divine Institutes VII.11, 21). Lactantius gave much more weight to the testimony of the Greek philosophers than Arnobius, and repeatedly cited them in support of the soul’s immortality (VII.7–13).

Conclusion

    The third century saw the spread of both universalism and infernalism, the former in the East and the latter in the West. As Origen’s influence spread, universal restoration became the dominant view of the eastern, Greek-speaking church, and was held by all the major eastern church fathers of this period. In contrast, the western, Latin-speaking church remained divided between infernalism (Minucius Felix; Cyprian; Lactantius), annihilationism (Hippolytus?; Arnobius), and universalism (Novatian?). It appears that all of these views were considered to be acceptable theologoumena by the third-century church.

Part 6: Fourth-Century Fathers (1/2)

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[1] Ilaria Ramelli and David Konstan, Terms for Eternity: Aiônios and Aïdios in Classical and Christian Texts (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2013), 129–30.

[2] Samuel Rubenson, “Origen in the Egyptian Monastic Tradition of the Fourth Century,” Origeniana VII (1999): 319–38; Charles Kannengiesser, “Origen’s Doctrine Transmitted by Antony the Hermit and Athanasius of Alexandria,” Origeniana VIII (2003): 889–901.

[3] Ilaria Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 236.

[4] Manlio Simonetti, “Origene in Occidente prima della controversia,” Augustinianum 46, no. 1 (2006): 25–34; György Heidl, The Influence of Origen on the Young Augustine (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2009), 237–72.

A response to Gavin Ortlund on universalism


    Gavin Ortlund, a Reformed theologian and apologist, just released a video on universalism in the early church. I respect Gavin and generally appreciate the content that he puts out, even though I don’t always agree. As you might expect, this is a topic on which I disagree with him. In this post, I’ll be responding to his video. I hope to show that the early church did not, in fact, oppose universalism, nor is universalism as problematic as Gavin thinks – and actually, Gavin’s own view has some troubling implications that I’ll discuss at the end. Before reading this post, I urge you to watch his video (embedded above) to make sure I’m not misrepresenting his arguments!

Introduction

    At the start of his video, Gavin defines universalism as “the doctrine that ultimately all shall be saved. Not just all human beings, but according to many expressions of this, all demons as well.” This is a fair definition of universalism, and I appreciate that unlike some other anti-universalists, he doesn’t strawman it as the view that hell doesn’t exist or that all people automatically go to heaven. Some universalists do believe these things, but they’re not part of mainstream Christian universalism.

    Gavin outlines three main points of his argument:

1. Universalism always had a rocky relationship with orthodoxy. From its emergence in second-century Alexandrian gnostic teachers through the multiple waves of Christian controversy about Origen, an early Christian who affirmed universalism, it never really got a firm footing within the church.

2. Universalism has tended to be more speculative and philosophical in character, as opposed to textual or biblical in its motivations...

3. Universalism in the early church involved not just a different view of the final destination of reality, but a different framework for the entirety of reality, including creation and sometimes even the doctrine of God.

    He continues by emphasizing that universalism is becoming more popular in the church, across every Christian tradition.

Among Evangelicals, you think of different reactions to Rob Bell’s book Love Wins back in like 2011, 2012. Among Roman Catholics, you think about responses to various things that Pope Francis has said, like his... 2016 statement, “[This isn’t my dogma, just my thought:] I like to think of hell as being empty. [I hope it is.]” Among Eastern Orthodox Christians, you think of reactions to David Bentley Hart’s 2019 book That All Shall be Saved. But there’s lots of others, both popular level and academic, in all different Christian traditions, universalism is on the rise.

This is certainly true! We may disagree on whether this is a good thing or not, or whether it’s a result of undue modern influence on the church, but it’s hard to deny that Christian universalism is growing. I think it’s a good sign that popular-level teachers like Gavin Ortlund are engaging with universalism on its own terms, instead of just dismissing it as a heresy.

    Gavin’s careful to emphasize that “this is a tough topic... this is brutal” and he really desires every person to be saved, citing Romans 9:1–3 to show how we should deal with the topic of hell.

When we acknowledge the reality of final separation from God, we should do so soberly and with grief. It’s something that confronts me, I don’t feel comfortable with this doctrine, but I think we need to [acknowledge it]... The motive for rejecting universalism is that it’s a very problematic doctrine.

I appreciate this attitude toward the idea of people being separated from God, and I think we all should have this attitude, whether or not we believe that separation is final. This is very different from the attitude of some premodern infernalists, such as Tertullian and Aquinas, who believed that considering the torment of the wicked only enhances the happiness of the righteous (De Spectaculis 30; Summa Theologiae Suppl., 94). This isn’t to say that some universalists don’t also have an overly lenient view of separation from God, but wrongheaded attitudes toward hell aren’t unique to universalism or infernalism.

    Gavin concludes his introduction by saying,

In fact, ultimately the weight of Scripture and tradition are pretty decisively against [universalism]. I think Michael McClymond is correct in his analysis in this amazing two-volume book [The Devil’s Redemption]... I’m drawing a lot from this for this video. Basically what he says is, toward the beginning, “While universalism has undeniable curb appeal for the theological driver-by, the universalist house proves to be not a very livable place.” That really resonates. I think that’s right.

It’s unfortunate that Gavin primarily relies on McClymond’s work for his research, and doesn’t even attempt to address Ilaria Ramelli’s extensive research in The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, which deals with the exact topic of universalism in the early church. Ramelli is a respected patristics (early church) scholar, whereas McClymond had little experience in this area before writing The Devil’s Redemption. Of course, Ramelli’s credentials don’t make her infallible, nor does it make McClymond wrong. But the fact that Gavin doesn’t even cite or address Ramelli’s work on this topic means that he didn’t give both sides of this debate a fair shake, which is unfortunate!

Universalism and orthodoxy

    The next section of Gavin’s video deals with the first point of his argument: “Universalism has always had a tenuous relationship with orthodoxy.” He claims that

[Universalism] first emerged among certain gnostic teachers in and around Alexandria in the second century. [Quote onscreen: “Origen’s universalism was itself an adaptation and transformation of second-century gnosis.” The Devil’s Redemption, pp. 209] And those in turn influenced Origen and possibly Clement of Alexandria as well.

    Gavin relies entirely on McClymond for this claim, so let’s investigate his evidence. First, he cites Irenaeus’ statement that the Carpocratian sect believed in a kind of universal salvation for pure souls (not bodies; Against Heresies I.25.4). The Nag Hammadi text On the Origin of the World says that, in the end, darkness will be banished, “those who have not become perfect... will receive glory in their realms... but they will never enter the kingless realm,” and “all must return to the place where they came from... all of them will reveal their natures.” The Apocryphon of John distinguishes three classes of souls, one which will be saved immediately, one which will be saved through punishment, and one which will never repent and be saved. The Tripartite Tractate says that “all the limbs of the body of the Church” will be restored, but there are three classes of natures – spiritual, soulish, and material – and only the first two can be saved.

    What’s striking is that none of these ‘gnostic’ texts that McClymond quotes, with the possible exception of On the Origin of the World, are explicitly universalist! The Nag Hammadi texts distinguish between different natures of people, one of which will never be saved, so their view of restoration isn’t universal. Ramelli develops this point in her research (Apokatastasis, pp. 87–89; A Larger Hope, pp. 238–243). In any case, Origen strongly opposes ‘gnosticism’ – especially the “doctrine of natures” found at Nag Hammadi – in many of his writings, so it would be incredible if he adopted the centerpiece of his eschatology from the sects that he opposed. Indeed, as I showed in another post, Origen developed his doctrine of universal restoration precisely in opposition to the ‘gnostics’.

    Gavin continues,

Furthermore, Origen’s universalism was always controversial... You get these waves of controversy surrounding Origen. First around the turn of the fifth century and then again in a more protracted way throughout the sixth century. Ultimately, Origen’s views are rejected at the fifth ecumenical council in 553 AD. Though this is tricky because the condemnation is bound up with other aspects of Origen’s theology like his doctrine of pre-existent souls [sic].

This is true, but it’s an overstatement to say that Origen was always controversial. Gavin leaves out just how influential Origen was before these controversies. For example, St. Jerome wrote in AD 389 that “none but the ignorant will deny [Origen] to be the greatest teacher of the Church after the apostles” (On Hebrew Names, pref.). Furthermore, the controversies themselves were largely based on misinterpretations of Origen! He explicitly denied the doctrine of pre-existent souls (Comm in Matt XIII.1), and argued that every being except the Trinity is essentially embodied (De Princ II.2.2; 3.2–3; IV.4.8).

    Even though Origen was condemned at the fifth ecumenical council, the doctrine of universalism as such wasn’t condemned. Gavin acknowledges this, but argues that “the reception of this council” shows universalism was perceived to be condemned. This is true, but it was a later development; as Gavin goes on to acknowledge, canonized saints after AD 553 like St. Isaac of Nineveh and (arguably) St. Maximus were universalists, which means that universalism wasn’t perceived to be condemned until later. As a Protestant theologian, Gavin doesn’t accept tradition as infallible, and even Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christians believe that tradition outside ecumenical councils and ex cathedra papal pronouncements can be fallible. I’m not sure why he’s giving such weight to the informal ‘tradition’ of the medieval era.

    Gavin next addresses the argument that

Prior to the sixth century... universalism was more of a common view. Or sometimes what people say is that in the West you have Augustine, and the way the Western tradition goes is away from universalism towards particularism, but in the East there’s more friendliness to universalism.

He acknowledges that there were some universalists in the early Eastern church, including Didymus the Blind, Theodore of Mopsuestia, St. Gregory of Nyssa, possibly St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Maximus. I think that this is an understatement, and there were many more universalists in the early church (both East and West) – in fact, that universalism became the dominant view in third and fourth century Eastern Christianity – but that would require a whole lot more argumentation (which I plan to provide in later posts on this topic). For now, I’ll just point to Ramelli’s work again (Apokatastasis, pp. 223–658), which Gavin has failed to engage with.

    Gavin then points out two fourth-century Eastern theologians, St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom, who opposed universalism. (The single anti-universalist passage in Basil’s Regulae may be an interpolation, but I’ll treat it as authentic here.) The passages to which Gavin points argue against universalism on the basis that Scripture describes punishment as aiōnios (often translated “eternal”), and that our future life is described with the same adjective. However, both of these arguments are often addressed by Christian universalists, both today and as early as Origen. I’m not sure what Gavin’s point was in bringing up these arguments if he wasn’t going to acknowledge the universalist rebuttals or provide any counter-rebuttal.

    Gavin concludes this section of his video with a quote from Richard Bauckham’s 1978 article, “Universalism: A Historical Survey,” to the effect that virtually all Christians until the nineteenth century rejected universalism. However, Bauckham has since changed his view in response to Ilaria Ramelli’s research, and admitted that the extent of universalism in the early church has been “under-estimated”! (See his foreword to Ramelli’s book A Larger Hope.) I don’t think Gavin is being intentionally disingenuous, but it strikes me as at least strange that he cites Bauckham’s fifty-year-old article without acknowledging Ramelli’s later scholarship and Bauckham’s own shift.

Universalism and speculation

    The next section of the video deals with the second point of Gavin’s argument: “[Universalism] seems to be more speculative and philosophical in its character and in its motivations, as opposed to biblical.” He says that this may not be true of modern Christian universalists, but it’s generally true of universalism in the early church.

    There isn’t really much to respond to here. Gavin spends most of this section claiming that the passages in Scripture which seem to imply universalism are easier to reconcile with particularism, than the passages which seem to imply particularism are to reconcile with universalism. I think that it’s the other way around: the passages which seem to imply particularism can easily be reconciled with universalism, so long as we recognize that they refer to a period before the final restoration of all. It’s hard to substantiate either of these claims without getting into the weeds of Scriptural exegesis, which Gavin understandably doesn’t do here (since this video is supposed to be about the early church).

    Gavin points to Gregory of Nyssa as a patristic universalist who was more biblically-based in his belief in universalism. However, his universalism was still philosophically motivated, because (Gavin quotes patristic scholar Constantine Tsirpanlis), “The strongest and perhaps most convincing argument of Gregory in support of universal restoration and salvation is the finiteness of evil as non-existent.” I was really surprised when Gavin pointed to this as an overly philosophical or esoteric view, since the fact that evil is ontologically non-subsistent has been central to the orthodox Christian case against dualism since the second century! Augustine, who was a staunch anti-universalist, made this point in many of his writings! This is strange to me, but it only gets worse in the next section.

Universalism and ontology

    In the last section, Gavin moves on to his third point: “Universalism in the early church is not just a different vision of the ending of the story of creation, but it’s a different vision of the whole meaning of the story.” I actually agree with this to an extent, but I would develop this point in a very different direction than Gavin does. He continues, “Ultimately the question that comes up here is, is reality ultimately a synthesis, or is it more of a dialectic?” Gavin opts for the latter view, with some troubling consequences for his overall theology.

    Gavin argues that the biblical story is “creation  fall  redemption”, whereas the patristic universalist vision is “unity  diversity  reunion”. I fail to see how these two visions aren’t complementary. It looks to me like the second vision just is the first vision, translated into the language and concerns of the classical philosophy shared by the early church fathers. Not just universalists, but also anti-universalists like Augustine, conceived of the creation-fall-redemption story in terms of unity-diversity-reunion. (See especially Samantha Thompson, “What Goodness Is: Order as Imitation of Unity in Augustine,” The Review of Metaphysics 65:3, 525–553). The original and final state of creation isn’t an undifferentiated unity, to be sure, but it’s a unity nonetheless.

    Gavin then claims that Origen’s belief in the pre-existence of souls resulted from his vision of unity-diversity-reunion. Maybe this would be convincing if Origen actually believed in the pre-existence of souls, but he explicitly rejected that view (see above). Gavin then spends several minutes discussing Stephen bar-Sudayli, a sixth-century Christian mystic who believed that everything will become consubstantial with the Father in the universal restoration. But Stephen is certainly not representative of mainstream Christian universalism; he was the most extreme proponent of sixth-century ‘Origenism’ (which was a severe distortion of Origen’s actual views)! Gavin spends a disproportionate amount of time discussing bar-Sudayli, which gives the false impression that he’s representative in any way of patristic universalism.

    Gavin concludes,

There’s a reason why this ontological vision of oneness so often undergirds universalism: because it’s hard to see what grounds [universalism] apart from that. Put it like this. If you lose the primordial unity, what confidence do you have for eschatological unity?... The concern here is a deficient view of evil. Why can’t it be that Satan will forever hate God and that certain demons will forever hate God? And here’s the scary thought, that certain humans will forever hate God.

He’s right that it’s hard to detach universal salvation from the other aspects of patristic universalist thought. This is part of an interconnected web of beliefs that undergird and support one another. Your view of evil does affect your eschatology. But let’s see how Gavin develops this point:

Reality is a dialectic. Created reality is a dialectic. Good and evil are forever expanding apart from one another. It’s a different vision of everything. That seems to be what I think Scripture teaches.

    I was really shocked when I first watched this part of the video, because this view is dangerously close to dualism. In fact, it looks explicitly dualistic. If this is true, then evil is not a privation of good, despite what Christians have historically taught (including infernalists like Augustine and Aquinas), but a substance which exists in a dialectic with goodness. This was the view held by ancient ‘gnostic’ groups like the Valentinians, Marcionites, and Manichaeans. It was precisely this view that Origen opposed, in which context he developed his doctrine of universal restoration. Furthermore, dualism has concerning implications for the doctrine of God: if evil is a created substance, then either God who created it is (at least partially) evil, or there’s another God who created it.

    It’s troubling, but not surprising to me, that Gavin seems to embrace dualism in his opposition to universalism. Origen himself was concerned that if life and death will both exist eternally, then they must be ontologically equal, which is dualism (Comm in Rom V.7.8). Even Augustine, in his polemics against the dualist Manichaeans, used an argument that seems to imply universalism (De moribus II.7.9). I have a hard time believing that Gavin is actually a dualist in the way that the ‘gnostics’ were, but his argument against universalism certainly looks like it. This just highlights how infernalism and non-dualism exist in tension with one another. So yes, one’s view of evil does affect one’s eschatology! But this really doesn’t seem to be a point against universalism!

Conclusion

    Gavin Ortlund’s video about universalism in the early church doesn’t really bring up any arguments that haven’t been addressed before. Many of the points that he makes were already rebutted by Origen nearly two thousand years ago. What I find most remarkable about this video is how openly Gavin seems to embrace dualism in his opposition to universalism. Thankfully, based on the comments of the video, it looks like most people recognize that these arguments are inadequate! In an update comment, Gavin says he’s planning to read Ilaria Ramelli’s book, so hopefully he can address this topic again in a future video with more research and better arguments that don’t retread old ground. If he does, I look forward to watching it.

The Restoration of All: Universalism in Early Christianity (part 4)

Part 3: Second-Century Apologists

The “Man of Steel”: Origen of Alexandria

    Origen was an influential Christian theologian at Alexandria in the third century. Origen was the first systematic theologian, and had a great influence on the later church. Whereas universalism (as we’ve seen) existed in many earlier Christian authors, he provided a clear systematization of it as a doctrine. He did the same for other Christian views, such as trinitarian theology (he was the first to apply the language of one ousia and three hypostaseis to God, which became prominent in the fourth-century theological conflicts). [1] Unfortunately, some of the doctrines that he held were considered orthodox in his day, but were distorted by his later followers and then condemned as heresy, resulting in the condemnation of Origen himself. [2] However, this doesn’t diminish his influence on the third- and fourth-century church. Here we’ll examine his idea of universal apokatastasis in detail.

Evil as Non-Being

    Origen developed his uniquely Christian philosophy in opposition to the ‘gnostic’ Christian groups that existed at that time. These ‘gnostics’ typically held to a stark division between the spiritual and material worlds, the inherent goodness of the former and inherent evilness of the latter, and that humans must embrace the spiritual and escape the material. Valentinian ‘gnostics’ in particular believed that humanity was divided into three classes – material, soulish, and spiritual – that the spiritual would be saved (but not their bodies), the material would perish, and the soulish would have an uncertain salvation (Tripartite Tractate; Irenaeus, AH I.6.1–2). This was effectively an extreme form of predestination, which Origen referred to as the “doctrine of natures” and strongly opposed.

    Origen frequently engages the “doctrine of natures,” which he attributes to the ‘gnostics’ Valentinus and Marcion, in his commentary on Romans. He begins by proving that Paul was “set apart for God’s gospel” (Rom 1:1) not because he had a special nature, but because he chose goodness (Comm in Rom I.3). God judges people according to their heart, works, and thoughts (Rom 2:10, 16), not because of their nature (II.4.7; 10.2). God reconciled himself to us “while we were enemies” (Rom 5:10), showing that enemies are not so by nature (IV.12.1–2). A person can present themself as slave to either sin or righteousness, and broken off or grafted into the olive tree (Rom 6:16–18; 11:16–24), they are not determined to one or the other (VI.3.3–5; VIII.11). In fact, based on Rom 14:14ff, the fact is that “none of the things God has created is unclean of its own nature” – it is only “because of the offence” that “what is good of its own nature becomes evil” (XI.42; X.3).

    His philosophical basis for this draws upon the idea, common in classical philosophy, that evil is simply a privation (lack) of goodness and not something that subsists in itself. This view was first proposed by Plato and Aristotle, and further developed by Plotinus (a later contemporary of Origen). Origen sets forth a Christian argument for this in his commentary on John 1:3:

“For the Lord said to Moses, ‘He who is, this is my name.’” [Exod 3:14] Now according to us who boast that we belong to the Church, it is the good God who speaks these words. This is the same God the Savior honors when he says, “No one is good except the one God, the Father.” [Mk 10:18] “The one who is good,” therefore, is the same as “the one who is.’’ But evil or wickedness is opposite to the good, and “not being” is opposite to “being.” It follows that wickedness and evil are “not being.” (Comm in John II.95–96)

This argument is Scripturally based: since God is the One who Is and Good, it follows that being and being good are fundamentally the same; therefore, evil is not-being. Origen also adduces a couple of passages that refer to evil or evildoers as “those which are not” (II.94–95; cf. Rom 4:17; Esth 4:22 LXX). He offers yet another argument in his commentary on Romans 14:14–20: “none of the things God has created is unclean of its own nature—for it is an established fact that everything created by the good God is good and clean” (Comm in Rom XI.42.4). In other words, God is Good, and therefore whatever he creates is good, which means that evil is a non-creature. 

    This is crucial to Origen’s understanding of rational creatures and his refutation of ‘gnosticism’. He sees all rational creatures as having fundamentally the same nature, so that none of them is inherently morally good or evil, but rather every being – with the exception of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit – has the ability to choose good and evil (De Princ I.8.2–3; Comm in John XX.198ff). Even the devil, qua rational being, is not evil in his substance, for that would mean that (as the “deceived” claim) he was made by a different creator.

For insofar as he is the devil, he is not a creation of God, but to the extent that it falls to the devil ‘to be,’ being made, since there is no creator except our God, he is a creation of God. It is as if we should say that a murderer is not a creation of God, while we do not annul the fact that qua man, he has been made by God. (Comm in John II.97)

This concept of evil as not-being, and created substances (qua created by God) as good, is very important for Origen’s eschatology as we will see. It also clears up the controversy of whether or not he believed in the ultimate salvation of the devil.

Punishment as Purification

    Another crucial idea developed by Origen, which (like his concept of evil as not-being) has Scriptural and earlier patristic roots, is that God punishes in order to correct. This teaching is found explicitly in some biblical authors (Lam 3:31-33; Heb 12:5-11), along with the theme of punishment and restoration throughout the prophets, and it recurs frequently in the writings of Origen’s predecessor Clement of Alexandria (see my previous post). Origen himself developed this view in opposition to the Marcionite ‘gnostics,’ who distinguished the ‘just’ god YHWH of the Hebrew Bible from the ‘good’ Father of Jesus. Contrary to Marcion, he insists on the identity of YHWH and the Father, drawing heavily on the New Testament to support this view (De Princ II.4).

    According to the “heretics,” since YHWH is ‘just’ while the Father is ‘good,’ they can’t be the same; for them, ‘justice’ is retribution, while ‘goodness’ is (equally) doing good to all people indiscriminately (De Princ II.5.1). Origen shows that, according to Scripture, it is also true that YHWH is good and the Father is just, so their view is wrong (II.5.2). Moreover, he draws upon the theme of punishment and restoration in the prophets to show that God’s justice is restorative and not retributive (II.5.3). According to Ezekiel, Sodom who was punished shall be restored (Ezek 16:55); according to Isaiah, Babylon’s punishment is a “help” to her (Isa 47:14–15 LXX); according to Asaph, those whom God punished afterward “sought” him (Ps 78:34).

From all these illustrations it is plain that the just and good God of the law and the gospels is one and the same, and that he does good with justice and punishes in kindness, since neither goodness without justice nor justice without goodness can describe the dignity of the divine nature. (De Princ II.5.3; cf. II.10.6–7; Comm in Rom VI.5.5)

Origen then returns to direct Scriptural affirmations that the God of the law is “good” and the God of the gospels is “just,” so the Marcionites are wrong (II.5.4). His view of punishment as restorative is crucial to his defense against the ‘gnostics’: if God punished someone without a view to their ultimate good, then his justice and goodness would be incompatible. For Origen, God is simple (without parts), so his attributes could not possibly conflict (De Princ I.I.6).

    This view of punishment as restorative is found throughout Origen’s many writings (e.g., De Princ II.10.6–8; Hom in Exod III.3; VIII.5–6; Hom in Jer I.15–16; VI.2; XII.5; Contra Celsum III.75; IV.72, 99; V.31). He holds that even death is purifying punishment (Comm in Matt 15.15; Hom in Lev 14.4). We already saw this view in Theophilus of Antioch, who held that physical death was inflicted after the fall so as to prevent fallen humans to sin forever and incur eternal punishment (To Autolycus II.26). Likewise, for Origen, eternal punishment is not possible for God, since by definition that could not be restorative. The Scriptural affirmation of aiōnios punishment (e.g., Matt 25:46) presents no challenge, for he is aware that aiōnios in Greek properly refers to the aeons and not eternity:

In the Scriptures “aeon” is sometimes recorded because the end is not known, but sometimes because the time period designated does not have an end in the present aeon, though it does end in the future. Sometimes a period of time or even the length of one man’s life may be designated as “aeon” (Comm in Rom VI.5.9)

“Lord, you who rule from aeon to aeon and beyond.” [Exod 15:18] As often as “from aeon to aeon” is said a length of time is indicated but there is some end. And if Scripture says “into another aeon,” certainly something longer is indicated, but an end is set. And as often as “the aeons of the aeons” is mentioned some termination is indicated, although perhaps unknown to us, nevertheless established by God. But Scripture adds in this passage: “and beyond.” No sense of any termination or end remains. (Hom in Exod VI.13)

Origen doesn’t follow Plato and the Greek philosophers of his own day in using aiōn and aiōnios to refer to absolute eternity. Instead, he follows the Scriptural usage of these terms to refer to a lengthy but not endless period of time – an “age” or “aeon.” [3] God is called “aeonian” because he rules and acts within history, within the aeons (contrary to the more deistic God of the philosophers); but Scripture also says, “and beyond,” with reference to God’s rule and life. This shows that when the world reaches its telos, it will be “something more than an aeon... when all things are no longer in an aeon, but ‘God is all and in all’ [1 Cor 15:28]” (De Princ II.3.5).

    If “aeonian punishment” has an end, then on what basis does Origen maintain that “aeonian life” will be endless? He gives two complementary answers to this inquiry. First, “aeonian life” is primarily a quality of life, not its duration; it is the quality of intimately knowing God and Jesus (Comm in Rom II.5.8; 7.4). We know that this is endless not because the word aiōnios is used – since that word has many meanings – but because other words like “always” (pantote) are used (VI.5.9). In another sense, however, aeonian life will end. Our knowledge of God and Christ within the aeons will be superceded by an even better life when the aeons end. Referencing the “aeonian tabernacle” of 1 Cor 5:1, he says that “there is a stage that is beyond this and superior to rational creatures. In that state, rational creatures will be in the Father and the Son, or rather in the Trinity” (Sel in Ps 60). For the Father is “beyond aeonian life” (Comm in John XIII.18–19).

The End as the So-Called Restoration

    This topic naturally leads to Origen’s view of the end of history. For him, since the substance of every rational creature is fundamentally good, and God’s punishments are aimed at turning their corrupted wills back to the good, it is impossible that evil could exist forever. This belief wasn’t a result of the influence of Greek philosophy, but followed from his ‘orthodox’ polemics against the ‘gnostic’ heretics. In fact, Plato himself believed that some sinners are “incurable” (e.g., Phaedo 113E2); Origen rejected this view on the Christian grounds that God is the Almighty Physician, so it is possible for him to cure any of his creatures, even the worst (De Princ III.6.5; cf. Contra Celsum VIII.72). 

    For Origen, the “restoration” (apokatastasis) of all rational beings is the goal to which all of history aims. In his commentary on John 1:1, with reference to the “beginning” in which the Logos “was,” he says regarding the corresponding “end”:

I think the stopping point and goal [telos] is the so-called restoration, because no one is left as an enemy then, if indeed the statement is true, “For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet. And the last enemy to be destroyed is death.” [1 Cor 15:25–26] For at that time those who have come to God through the Logos who is “with him” [John 1:1] will have the contemplation of God as their only activity, that, having been accurately formed in the knowledge of the Father, they may all thus become a son, since now the Son alone has known the Father [Matt 11:27]. (Comm in John I.91–93)

Later in his commentary, he states that the telos will be simultaneous with Christ’s coming, citing 1 Cor 15:23–24 (Comm in John XXXII.27–30). The fact that he says that the end is the “so-called” restoration implies that he is relating something that has been previously taught.

    One of his sources is clearly 1 Corinthians 15:24–28, which actually refers to the subjection of God’s enemies as the telos. This passage is Origen’s primary Scriptural basis for his belief in the universal restoration, and he devotes a large portion of his On First Principles to exegeting this text (De Princ I.6; III.5.6–6.8). He thinks that the subjection of God’s enemies refers to their salvation for two reasons. First, because it is explicitly said in Scripture that subjection to God is salvation (De Princ I.6.1; cf. Ps 62:1). Second, because this same subjection is applied to Christ. Contrary to the “heretics,” who “deprecate using the term subjection in regard to the Son,” the subjection of the Son can be nothing but “good and salutary,” and includes the “perfect restoration of the entire creation” which will at that time have been incorporated into the body of Christ (De Princ III.5.7; cf. Eph 1:10).

    Another source for Origen’s belief in the universal restoration is likely Acts 3:21, which connects the “restoration of all things” to Christ’s return. In fact, he references this passage to support his view that the “perfect telos” of the world will be the restoration (De Princ II.3.5; cf. Comm in Matt 17.19). Finally, a third source for his belief that the “telos is the so-called restoration” is likely his predecessor Clement of Alexandria, who also said that Paul “teaches that the telos is the restoration we hope for” (Stromata II.22). We shouldn’t discount the influence of Clement, who was a clear universalist, on Origen, although we also shouldn’t overemphasize this influence (it’s unlikely that Origen actually studied under Clement, as has often been thought).

    Origen’s belief in universal restoration is not only based in Scripture, but also philosophy – that is, Christian philosophy, not Greek philosophy. As noted above, his beliefs that evil is non-being and that God’s punishment is restorative lead directly to his universalism. It is possible for a soul to become so fully integrated around goodness that its good will is “changed into nature”; this is precisely what happened with Christ’s human soul (De Princ II.6.5–7). In fact, this is precisely why, after the restoration of all beings, there will be no more fall, and Christ will not need to be sacrificed a second time (Origen considers this thought to be absurd). All beings will have been made perfect in the love of Christ, and “love never fails” (Comm in Rom V.10.12–16).

    But it is not possible for a soul to become fully integrated around evil in this way; evil is non-being, and such a soul would cease to exist. Scripture affirms that God “created all things so that they might exist” (Wis 1:14), so he would not allow any of his creatures to pass completely into non-being (De Princ III.6.5; Hom in Jer I.16; Contra Celsum V.22). Death and life are two contraries, one is the privation of the other; therefore, they cannot both be of eternal duration, for that would make them ontologically equal. “Therefore it is certain that if life is eternal, death cannot be eternal” (Comm in Rom V.7.8). It’s interesting that Origen opposes his universalism to annihilation, and not to eternal torment; this may reflect the state of Christian eschatological discourse in his day, since (as I showed in my previous posts) universalism and annihilation/conditionalism were the two main options at this time.

    Did Origen believe that even the devil would be saved, then? Some scholars have actually argued that he didn’t, based on a handful of passages where he speaks of the devil’s destruction (e.g., Hom in Lev XI.11.2; Contra Celsum VI.44). [4] This seems impossible to maintain in light of his repeated forceful statements that all rational beings will be restored, that God will be truly “in all” without exception. But one of his statements about the devil is particularly confusing:

They say that I claim that the father of wickedness and perdition, and of those who are cast out of the kingdom of God, namely, the devil, is to be saved. This is something which not even a madman and someone who is manifestly insane can say. (quoted in Rufinus, On the Falsification 7)

    Does he contradict himself here? Not if we understand the nuances of his position. For Origen, “the devil” is a title that properly refers not to the substance of the one who became the devil, which (qua creature of God) is fundamentally good, but to his evil choices and will (De Princ I.5.2; Comm in John II.97; Contra Celsum IV.65). The destruction of the “last enemy” will not involve the destruction of his substance, but the destruction of his hostile will, so that he is no longer devil (De Princ III.6.5). It would indeed be wrong to maintain that “the devil” will be saved, since that would mean that his evil will is saved, which is nonsense – but that’s precisely the view that his opponent Candidus falsely attributed to him (which he was refuting in the above passage), since Candidus was a ‘gnostic’ who believed that the devil was evil in his nature.

    In his polemics with the ‘gnostics,’ Origen did not oppose universal restoration to freedom of choice, but held that it is certain precisely because of freedom of choice (along with the asymmetry of good and evil). Freedom of choice is why it will be possible even for demons and the devil to return to the Good in future aeons (De Princ I.6.3; Comm in Rom V.10.13–14). The reason why all will ultimately be restored eternally is that good, unlike evil, can become nature for a rational being, as it did for Christ’s human soul. The love of Christ shown in his sacrifice is strong enough to fully integrate every creature within the Good (Comm in Rom V.10.12–18). Thus, despite his later critics, Origen’s universalism was in fact centered around Christ’s sacrifice and creatures’ freedom of choice.

    Although he clearly expounded universal restoration in his theological treatises, he was pastorally concerned that teaching this doctrine aloud would cause weaker brethren to sin. In his polemic against the pagan philosopher Celsus, Origen makes a brief mention of the purificatory nature of punishment, but says that these remarks “are neither to be made to all, nor to be uttered on the present occasion,” because of those who have difficulty restraining from sin (Contra Celsum VI.26). He even held that this same pastoral concern is why Paul said that “many” would be saved rather than “all men” in Rom 5:15 (Comm in Rom V.1.5–7). This should be kept in mind when we’re investigating the eschatology of those who were influenced by Origen; they may have kept their belief in universalism out of their pastoral and apologetic writings for this purpose.

Origen’s Influence

    Now that we’ve covered Origen’s Christian universalism in depth, let’s consider both the people who influenced him and those that he later influenced. There is a misconception that he was first and foremost a philosopher and only secondarily a Christian, and that he was heavily influenced by Middle Platonism. I don’t see this ‘Platonism’ in his writings to any great extent.

    Origen explicitly rejected Plato’s thesis of an external world of Forms (De Princ II.3.6). His concept of time was more influenced by Stoicism than Platonism, and even then he staunchly opposed the Stoic idea of an eternal succession of identical aeons (De Princ II.3.4; Contra Celsum IV.67–68). [5] His most Platonic view was the privation theory of evil, but he developed this primarily on the basis of Scripture, not philosophical arguments. His universalism was in opposition to Plato, who thought that some sinners were “incurable” (e.g., Phaedo 113E2). In my opinion, Origen would best be classified not as a Platonist, but as a uniquely Christian philosopher (one of the first of his kind).

    Origen had a great influence on the early church after him, especially the Eastern part of the church. He deeply influenced Athanasius of Alexandria and the three Cappadocian Fathers, who were the primary members of the victorious pro-Nicene faction in the fourth-century conflicts. In the late fourth century, Jerome wrote, “none but the ignorant will deny [Origen] to be the greatest teacher of the Church after the apostles” (On Hebrew Names pref.). This shows just how great his influence was, before the later controversies that regrettably marred his reputation within Christian tradition.

    Nearly all of the doctrines that were attributed to him in the sixth-century Origenist controversy were doctrines that he never held, and even explicitly refuted. For example, Origen did not believe in the idea of transmigration of souls – that souls pre-existed their bodies incorporeally – and actually called out this doctrine by name as false (Comm in Matt XIII.1). He believed that every being except for the Trinity is essentially embodied (De Princ II.2.2; 3.2–3; IV.4.8), and that the resurrection body maintains continuity of identity with the mortal body (De Princ II.10.1–3; III.6.6). Nor did he believe that Christ will be sacrificed again; he considered this an absurdity (Comm in Rom V.10.12–16). This should suffice to show that Origen himself was not an ‘Origenist’; his views were badly distorted up to the sixth century, and he was wrongly condemned.

Part 5: Third-Century Fathers

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[1] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christinae 65 (2011): 21-49.

[2] Mark Edwards, “Origen of Alexandria,” in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Patristics, ed. Ken Parry (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2015), 98-110.

[3] See my own blog post series on the usage of aiōn and aiōnios throughout Scripture.

[4] Lisa R. Holliday, “Will Satan Be Saved? Reconsidering Origen’s Theory of Volition in Peri Archon,” Vigiliae Christinae 63 (2009): 1-23; Michael S. Domeracki, “The Unchanging Mind: Origen’s Lifetime Argument and The Dissolution of the Devil.”

[5] P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time (Boston: Brill, 2006).

The Restoration of All: Universalism in Early Christianity (part 6)

Part 5: Third-Century Fathers Fourth Century Fathers (part 1)     In the past few posts, we’ve examined the views of all the major church fa...